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INTRODUCTION
Where was the FBI in the months leading up to the violent siege on
the U.S. Capitol in 2021? Among the many questions surrounding that
historic day, this one reveals the extent to which double standards in law
enforcement threaten our nation’s security. For weeks, Donald Trump’s
far right-wing supporters had been publicly calling for and planning a protest in Washington, D.C. on January 6, the day Congress was to certify the
2021 presidential election results. 1 Had they been following credible
threats to domestic security, officials would have attempted to stop the
Proud Boys and QAnon from breaching the Capitol perimeter. 2 Yet when
the day came, the mob of pro-Trump extremists seemed to catch law
* Kleh Visiting Distinguished Professor of International Law, Boston University
School of Law. Professor of Law and Chancellor’s Social Justice Scholar, Rutgers University
Law School. The author thanks Alexander Reinert, Shirin Sinnar, William Banks, Stephen
Dycus, Mike German and Jonathan Hafetz for their feedback on earlier drafts. She also
thanks Sabah Abassi, Joseph Carr, and Dina Mansour for their research assistance.
1. See Rachel Treisman, Prosecutors: Proud Boys Gave Leader ‘War Powers,’ Planned Ahead
for Capitol Riot, NPR (Mar. 2, 2021, 4:00 PM), ttps://www.npr.org/2021/03/02/972895521
/prosecutors-proud-boys-gave-leader-war-powers-planned-ahead-for-capitol-riot; see also
Kyle Daly, The Capitol siege’s QAnon roots, AXIOS (Jan. 7, 2021), https://www.axios.com
/capitol-sieges-qanon-roots-acadc659-4d39-4606-96c3-a477c6841fe3.html.
2. Mazetti et al, Inside a Deadly Siege: How a String of Failures Led to a Dark Day at the
Capitol, N.Y. TIMES (June 8, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/10/us/politics
/capitol-siege-security.html.
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enforcement by surprise. They seized the Capitol, ransacked congress
members’ offices, and openly posted photos of their destruction and their
weapons online.3
In the preceding two decades, the U.S. government has poured
money into a behemoth national security apparatus. The FBI’s annual
budget ballooned from $3 billion in 1999 to nearly $10 billion today. 4
Much of this 300% increase went to countering terrorism with a mandate
to surveil, investigate, and prosecute “homegrown terrorists.”5 In no uncertain terms, the directive was for the FBI to target Muslim communities. 6
With bipartisan political support and significant resources backing
them, FBI agents are tasked to prey on young, mentally ill, indigent, or
otherwise vulnerable Muslim men as targets in government-led sting operations. 7 Before the ubiquity of social media, agents fished for their targets
through the surveillance of mosques, cafes frequented by Muslim customers, online chat rooms, and Muslim community organizations. 8 The FBI,
however, soon discovered the number of Muslims in the U.S. planning
legitimate terrorist plots is sparse. 9 Instead of shifting its attention to burgeoning right-wing extremists seeking to attack minorities and overthrow
the government, the FBI deployed its resources towards hiring dubious
informants who manipulate and coerce Muslim men in fake terrorist
plots. 10

3. Dina Temple-Raston, Lawyers For 18-Year-Old Capitol Rioter Want Him Released To
His Parents, NPR (Feb. 26, 2021), https://www.npr.org/sections/insurrection-at-the-capitol.
4. FBI FY 2019 BUDGET REQUEST AT A GLANCE, https://www.justice.gov/jmd/page
/file/1033146/download#:~:text=Resources%3A,the%20FY%202018%20Continuing%
20Resolution; FBI BUDGET, https://www.justice.gov/archive/jmd/1975_2002/2002/html
/page96-99.htm.
5. Sahar F. Aziz, Losing the ‘War of Ideas’: A Critique of Countering Violent Extremism Programs,
52 TEX. INT’L L. J. 255, 277 (2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id
=2913571.
6. Sahar F. Aziz, Caught in a Preventive Dragnet: Selective Counterterrorism in a Post-9/11
America, 47 Gonz. L. Rev. 429, 433 (2011), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
_id=1825662.
7. Trevor Aaronson & Paul Abowd, FBI Terrorism Stings: Two Decades of National Security
Theater, THE INTERCEPT (Sept. 10, 2021), https://theintercept.com/2021/09/11/fbi-counterterrorism-stings-two-decades-of-national-security-theater/; Janet Reitman, ‘I Helped Destroy People,’ N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 1, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/01/magazine
/fbi-terrorism-terry-albury.html; TREVOR AARONSON, THE TERROR FACTORY: INSIDE THE
FBI’S MANUFACTURED WAR ON TERRORISM 241 (2013) (concluding that approximately 1%
of so-called ‘jihadi’ cases present real security threats).
8. Sanya Mansoor, ‘Who Else Is Spying on Me?’ Muslim Americans Bring the Fight Against
Surveillance to the Supreme Court, TIME (Sept. 16, 2021, 1:13 PM), https://time.com/6097712
/muslim-american-surveillance-supreme-court-sept-11/.
9. Aaronson & Abowd, supra note 7.
10. Id.
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Compare these over-reaching practices with the government’s disregard of the well-documented rise in White far right-wing extremism.
When a 2009 DHS intelligence report warned of this troubling development, then-Secretary Janet Napolitano was pressured to retract it and apologize in a Congressional hearing. 11 And the author of the report was constructively pushed out of DHS. 12
For the eight years when Barack Obama, the first African American
president, governed the nation, far right-wing groups grew. 13 Little attention, and fewer resources, were directed at preventing violence by these
White extremist. 14 Meanwhile, the alt-right media amassed tens of millions of followers. 15 Extremist and anti-democratic ideas became normalized into the mainstream as Donald Trump ran on a xenophobic and Islamophobic platform.
Unsurprisingly, the rise in White Supremacy groups correlated with
increased racial violence against Black people, Latinos, Native Americans,
Asians and immigrants. 16 Congregants were killed in Jewish synagogues,
11. Brian Montopoli, DHS Report Warns of Right Wing Extremists, CBS NEWS (Apr. 14, 2009,
3:38 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/dhs-report-warns-of-right-wing-extremists/
[https://perma.cc/AM2M-KMYG] (referring to DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., RIGHTWING
EXTREMISM CURRENT ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CLIMATE FUELING RESURGENCE IN
RADICALIZATION AND RECRUITMENT (2009), https://irp.fas.org/eprint/rightwing.pdf
[https://perma.cc/D8CM-SV85]); Homeland Security Chief Apologizes to Veteran Groups,
CNN (Apr. 16, 2009), https://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/04/16/napolitano
.apology/ [https://perma.cc/N9VK-B74J].
12. Spencer Ackerman, DHS Crushed This Analyst for Warning about Far-Right Terror,
WIRED (Aug. 07, 2012, 5:07 PM), https://www.wired.com/2012/08/dhs/ [perma.cc
/79PSWWZ8]; Daryl Johnson, I Warned of Right-wing Violence in 2009. Republicans Objected. I Was right., WASH. POST (Aug. 21, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news
/posteverything/wp/2017/08/21/i-warned-of-right-wing-violence-in-2009-it-caused-anuproar-i-was-right/ [perma.cc/SSK8-NPWL].
13. Chris McGreal, US Facing Surge in Rightwing Extremists and Militias, GUARDIAN (Mar.
4, 2010, 12:18 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/mar/04/us-surge-rightwingextremist-groups; SETH G. JONES, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUD., THE RISE OF FARRIGHT EXTREMISM IN THE UNITED STATES (2018), https://www.csis.org/analysis/rise-farright-extremism-united-states.
14. See Civil Rights Groups Condemn Recent Rash of Hate Crimes, MEXICAN AM. LEGAL
DEF. & EDUC. FUND (Nov. 24, 2008), https://www.maldef.org/2008/11/civil-rightsgroups-condemn-recent-rash-of-hate-crimes/; Matthew Bigg, Election of Obama provokes
rise in U.S. hate crimes, REUTERS (Nov. 28, 2008, 5:41 PM), https://www.reuters.com
/article/us-usa-obama-hatecrimes/election-of-obama-provokes-rise-in-u-s-hate-crimesidUSTRE4AN81U20081124; Obama Win Sparks Rise in Hate Crimes, Violence, NPR (Nov.
28, 2008, 9:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/transcripts/97454237.
15. Charles Sykes, Donald Trump and the Rise of Alt-Reality Media, POLITICO (Nov. 25,
2016), https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/11/donald-trump-conservativemedia-charlie-sykes-214483/.
16. Joe Hernandez, Hate Crimes Reach The Highest Level In More Than A Decade, NPR
(Sept. 1, 2021, 11:17 AM), https://www.npr.org/2021/08/31/1032932257/hate-crimes-
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Sikh temples, and Black churches.17 Mosques were vandalized or burned
to the ground. 18 Muslims continued to be victims of racial violence by
individuals who subscribed to far-right wing extremist ideologies. 19 In
2020, reported hate crimes rose to the highest level in more than a decade. 20 These developments should have shifted the FBI’s investigative mission to this rising domestic security threat. But instead, the FBI continued
its quest to manufacture “Muslim terrorism” through aggressive sting operations and abusive investigative practices. 21
What we witnessed on January 6, 2021 demonstrates that the threat
to our national security from right wing groups is not merely extremist
speech, but political violence. So how did a mob of thousands of people
premeditate such a criminal attack on our nation’s Congress in plain sight?
The answer lies squarely in America’s post-9/11 racial politics. 22 The resources and expertise exist to prevent such violence by White far-right
extremists.23 Unfortunately, the political will does not.
A key component of this system of manufactured homegrown terrorism is the government’s reliance on unsubstantiated, pseudo-academic

reach-the-highest-level-in-more-than-a-decade; Dan Mangan, Hate crimes against Asian and
Black people rise sharply in the U.S., FBI says, CNBC (Aug. 30, 2021, 3:38 PM), https://
www.cnbc.com/2021/08/30/fbi-says-hate-crimes-against-asian-and-black-people-rise-inthe-us.html; DEP’T OF JUSTICE, HATE CRIME STATISTICS (2020), https://www.justice.gov
/hatecrimes/hate-crime-statistics.
17. Poway Attack Illustrates Danger Right-Wing Extremists Pose to Jews, Muslims, ADL (May
2, 2019), https://www.adl.org/blog/poway-attack-illustrates-danger-right-wing-extremistspose-to-jews-muslims; Joanna Walters & Alvin Chang, Far-Right Terror Poses Bigger Threat
to US Than Islamist Extremism Post-9/11, GUARDIAN (Sept. 8, 2021, 3:00 PM), https://
www.theguardian.com/us-news/2021/sep/08/post-911-domestic-terror.
18. See Nationwide Anti-Mosque Activity, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/issues/nationalsecurity/discriminatory-profiling/nationwide-anti-mosque-activity (last updated Nov. 2021).
19. See IMRAN AWAN & IRENE ZEMPI, OFFLINE AND ONLINE EXPERIENCES OF ANTIMUSLIM CRIME: FOR THE SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR ON FREEDOM OF RELIGION OR BELIEF
(2020), https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Religion/Islamophobia-AntiMuslim
/Civil%20Society%20or%20Individuals/ProfAwan-3.pdf; Ziauddin Sardar, Jordi Serra &
Scott Jordan, Islamophobia and The Rise of the Alt-Right, in MUSLIM SOCIETIES IN POSTNORMAL
TIMES 1, 87 (2019), https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/j.ctv10kmcpb.20.pdf?refreqid=excelsior
%3A04a0e9cbf856a304cc2876d2ba9c5387.
20. Hernandez, supra note 16; What is the Threat to the United States Today?, NEW AM.,
https://www.newamerica.org/international-security/reports/terrorism-in-america/whatis-the-threat-to-the-united-states-today/ (last visited Oct. 25, 2021).
21. Paula Moura, Are Federal Sting Operations in U.S. Counterterrorism Cases Legal?, PBS
(Aug. 10, 2021), https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/fbi-sting-operations-terrorismseptember-11/.
22. See Caroline Mala Corbin, Terrorists Are Always Muslim but Never White: At the Intersection of Critical Race Theory and Propaganda, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 455 (2017).
23. Id. at 484.

FALL 2021]

State Sponsored Radicalization

129

theories of radicalization as the blueprint for their sting operations. 24 Specifically, the government creates a fake group of friends comprised of informants and undercover agents that push the Muslim target from extreme
words to illegal action. 25 The consequence has been a loss of liberty for
hundreds of Muslim men concurrent with awards and accolades for FBI
agents and national security prosecutors. 26 The inability of scholars to identify what causes terrorism further highlights the determinative role of religious identity in counterterrorism sting operations.
The systematic and aggressive use of sting operations in counterterrorism cases—regardless of whether a case ultimately pleads out or goes to
trial—disproportionately target Muslim defendants who are 1) young, with
an average age of 33, 2) low income or unemployed, 3) bombastic blowhards who “talk, talk, talk, and do nothing,” 27 and 4) generally unsophisticated with a lack of skills or knowledge to conduct a terrorist attack. 28 In
at least 130 of the 631 cases, there is evidence that the defendant suffers
from mental illness, which is sometimes not diagnosed until after his arrest
and detention. 29 These vulnerable Muslim male targets are easy prey for
dubious informants or sophisticated undercover agents who design, plan,
and execute the fake terrorist plots. 30 The result is a 99% incarceration
rate. 31 Yet, other empirical studies of counterterrorism cases find that
24. Carissa Prevratil, Creating Terrorists: Issues with Counterterrorism Tactics and the
Entrapment Defense (Sep. 17, 2020) (M.A. thesis, California State University), https://
www.ramapo.edu/law-journal/thesis/.
25. Id.
26. MCAO Prosecutors Receive FBI Director’s Award for Prosecuting Terrorism Case, MARICOPA
CNTY. ATT’Y’S OFF., https://www.maricopacountyattorney.org/390/MCAO-ProsecutorsReceive-FBI-Directors-A#:~:text=Prosecuting%20Terrorism%20Case-,MCAO%20Prosecutors%
20Receive%20FBI%20Director’s%20Award%20for%20Prosecuting%20Terrorism%20Case,
Office%2C%20in%20combatting%20international%20terrorism (last visited Oct. 25, 2021);
Raleigh-Durham Joint Terrorism Task Force Receives FBI Director’s Award, FBI (Sept. 10, 2012),
https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/charlotte/press-releases/2012/raleigh-durham-jointterrorism-task-force-receives-fbi-directors-award.
27. Marc Sageman, The Stagnation in Terrorism Research, 26 TERRORISM & POL. 565, 575
(2014).
28. The database of terrorism related cases against Muslims is on file with the author.
29. See, e.g., Brief and Special Appendix for Defendant-Appellant at 36, United States v.
Siraj, 468 F. Supp. 2d 408 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (No. 07-0224-cr); United States v. Osmakac,
868 F.3d 967 (11th Cir. 2017); United States v. Hamdan, 2016 WL 9244751, No. 2:14-cr20232 (E.D. Mich.Apr. 20, 2016). Seventy defendants are documented as suffering from
demonstrable mental illness, however, the actual number is likely higher due to a lack of
access to health care for diagnosis and the stigma of admitting mental illness.
30. See, e.g., Rozina Ali, The ‘Herald Square Bomber’ Who Wasn’t, N.Y. TIMES MAG.
(Apr. 13, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/15/magazine/fbi-internationalterrorism-informants.html.
31. See United States v. Liban Hussein, 1:01-cr-10423 (D. Mass. 2001) (acquitted); United States v. Habis Abdulla Al Saoub, 02-cr-00399-ha (D. Oregon 2002) (fugitive); United
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despite the prosecutors’ success in court, the percentage of cases against
Muslim defendants that represent real security threats range from 9% to as
low as 1%. 32 These numbers are attributed to coercive and manipulative
tactics by informants and undercover agents leading a target from nonviolent extremist speech to a (fake) terrorist plot.

States v. Jaber A. Elbaneh, 02-cr-214s (W.D.N.Y. 2002) (fugitive); United States v. Sami
Omar Al-Hussayen, 03-cr-048-c-ejl (D. Idaho 2003) (acquitted); United States v. Oussama
Ziade, 1:07-cr-10072 (D. Mass. 2005) (acquitted); United States v. Naudimer Herrera,
1:06-cr-20373-jal (S.D. Fla. 2006) (acquitted); United States v. Lyglenson Lemorin, 1:06cr-20373-jal (S.D. Fla. 2006) (acquitted); United States v. Youssef Mehahed, 2:07-cr01167-rsc (M.D. Fla. 2007) (acquitted); United States v. Yaser Khareddin Bushnaq, 1:0700377 (E.D. Va. 2007) (fugitive); United States v. Tahmeed Ahmad, 007-cr-20859 (S.D.
Fla. 2007) (acquitted); United States v. Jude Kenan Mohammad, 5:09-cr-00216 (E.D.N.C.
2009) (fugitive); United States v. Omar Hammami, 07-00384-kd (S.D. Ala. 2009) (fugitive); United States v. Cabdulaahi Ahmed Faarax, 09-50-jmr-srn (D. Minn. 2009) (fugitive); United States v. Jehad Serwan Mostafa, 09-cr-3726-whq (S.D. Cal. 2009) (fugitive);
United States v. Luqman Ameen Abdullah, 2:09-cr-20549 (E.D. Mich. 2009) (deceased);
United States v. Abdul Saboor, 2:09-cr-20549 (E.D. Mich. 2009) (fugitive); United States
v. Mujahid Carswell, 2:09-cr-20549 (E.D. Mich. 2009) (has not yet been extradited); United States v. Hodroj Hasssan, 2:09-cr-00744 (E.D. Pa. 2009) (fugitive); United States v.
Dib Hani Harb, 2:09-cr-20549 (E.D. Pa. 2009) (fugitive); United States v. Hasan Antar
Karaki, 2:09-cr-20549 (E.D. Pa. 2009) (fugitive); United States v. Ahmed Ali Omar, 0:09cr-00050 (N.D. Ohio 2010) (fugitive); United States v. Khalid Mohamud Abshi, 0:09-cr00050 (N.D. Ohio 2010); United States v. Zakaria Maruf, 0:09-cr-00050 (N.D. Ohio
2010); United States v. Mohamed Abdullahi Hassan, 0:09-cr-00050 (N.D. Ohio 2010) )
(fugitive); United States v. Mustafa Ali Salat, 0:09-cr-00050 (N.D. Ohio 2010) ) (fugitive);
United States v. Fareh Mohamed Beledi, 0:09-cr-00050 (N.D. Ohio 2010) ) (fugitive);
United States v. Abdisalan Hussein Ali, 0:09-cr-00050 (N.D. Ohio 2010) ) (fugitive);
United States v. Abdikadir Ali Abdi, 0:09-cr-00050 (N.D. Ohio 2010) ) (fugitive); United
States v. Mohammed Abdullahi Hassan, 13-cr-00222 (D. Minn. 2010) (fugitive); United
States v. Irfan Khan, 1:11-cr-20331 (S.D. Fla. 2011) (charges dismissed); United States v.
Izhar Khan, 1:11-cr-20331 (S.D. Fla. 2011) (charges dismissed); United States v. Abdi Nur,
0:14-mj-01024 (D. Minn. 2014) (fugitive); United States v. Yusra Ismail, 14-mj-1047 (D.
Minn. 2014) (fugitive); United States v Reza Niknejad, 1:15-mj-325 (E.D. Va. 2015) (fugitive); United States v. Adam Shafi, 3:15-cr-00582 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (fugitive); United
States v. Talha Haroon, 1:16-cr-00376 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) ) (fugitive); United States v. Russell Salic, 1:16-cr-00376 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) ) (fugitive); United States v. Mohamed Amiin
Ali Roble, 0:16-mj-00584 (D. Minn. 2016) (fugitive); United States v. Noor Zahi Salman,
6:17-cr-00018 (M.D. Fla. 2017) (acquitted); United States v. Omar Ali, case number unavailable (E.D. Tex. 2017) (fugitive); United States v. Arman Ali, case number unavailable (E.D.
Tex. 2017) (fugitive); United States v. Faress Muhammad Shraiteh, 1:18-cr-00490 (N.D.
Ill. 2017) (fugitive).
32. Jesse J. Norris & Hanna Grol-Prokopzyk, Estimating the Prevalence of Entrapment in
Post-9/11 Terrorism Cases, 105 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 609, 616 (2015) (estimating
that 9% of the 580 of so-called “jihadi” cases they analyzed involved real security threats);
TREVOR AARONSON, THE TERROR FACTORY: INSIDE THE FBI’S MANUFACTURED WAR
ON TERRORISM 241 (2013) (concluding that approximately 1% of so-called ‘jihadi’ cases
present real security threats).
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Perhaps the most alarming theme is the U.S. government’s deliberate
replication in sting operations of the so-called “radicalization” process
proffered by self-identified terrorism experts in the academic and policy
literature. 33 Despite clear scholarly consensus that there is no theoretical
model, much less empirical support, that accurately predicts whether a person will engage in political violence, law enforcement unduly relies on
dubious radicalization theories. 34
Attempting to explain why and how a person becomes a terrorist,
scholars and policy makers offer a hodgepodge of unproven theories that
effectively profile and criminalize Muslims who hold political or religious
beliefs significantly outside prevailing norms.35 Some of these so-called
radicalization theories go so far as interpreting an increase in religiosity by
young Muslim men as a dangerous sign of “radicalization” on the path
toward becoming a terrorist. 36
One expert’s radicalization theory, the “bunch of guys” by Marc
Sageman, appears to be the model informing how government informants
and undercover agents execute sting operations targeting Muslims. Sageman contends that “jihadi terrorism” has three components: 1) a socialization process of friendship and kinship; 2) progressive intensification of beliefs leading to acceptance of the Salafi ideology; 3) and a link to knowhow and support. 37 Sageman’s radicalization theory is the basis of his recommendations to federal agencies to prevent terrorism through engagement with Muslim communities and off-ramping aggrieved Muslim extremists. 38 These so-called engagement efforts, however, have only served
33. See Sageman, supra note 27, at 571 (noting that “neo-jihadi terrorists attacks are extremely rare on their own—without sting operations”); LISA STAMPNITZKY, DISCIPLINING
TERROR: HOW EXPERTS INVENTED “TERRORISM” (2013) (providing the genealogy of the
terrorism industry after the end of European colonialism).
34. Robin L. Thompson, Radicalization and the Use of Social Media, 4 J. STRATEGIC SEC.
167, 179 (2011); Randy Borum, Radicalization into Violent Extremism I: A Review of Social
Science Theories, 4 J. STRATEGIC SEC. 7, 7 (2012); Randy Borum, Radicalization into Violent
Extremism II: A Review of Conceptual Models of Empirical Research, 4 J. STRATEGIC SEC. 37
(2012); Amna Akbar, Policing “Radicalization,” 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 809 (2020); JOHN
HORGAN, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF TERRORISM (POLITICAL VIOLENCE) 7, 33 (2d ed. 2014)
(noting that despite the increase in publications over the past 20 years, few of the articles
are rigorous and research-based and are instead narrative or prescriptive); Arun Kundnani,
Radicalisation: the Journey of a Concept, 54 RACE & CLASS 3 (2012).
35. See, e.g., MIKE GERMAN, DISRUPT, DISCREDIT, AND DIVIDE: HOW THE FBI
DAMAGES DEMOCRACY 111 (2019); Jamie Bartlett & Carl Miller, The Edge of Violence:
Towards Telling the Difference Between Violent and Non-Violent Radicalization, 24 TERRORISM
& POL. VIOLENCE 1 (2012).
36. See Mitchell D. SILBER & ARVIN BHATT, N.Y.C. POLICE DEP’T, RADICALIZATION
IN THE WEST: THE HOMEGROWN THREAT 6 (2007), https://seths.blog/wp-content/uploads
/2007/09/NYPD_Report-Radicalization_in_the_West.pdf.
37. MARC SAGEMAN, UNDERSTANDING TERROR NETWORKS 107-21 (2004).
38. Id. at 180-81.
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as an additional entry point in which government agents recruit informants
who then prey on vulnerable Muslim men to expand the number and
scope of sting operations.39
Accordingly, this Article is the first in a series that empirically test the
normative claim made in the author’s book The Racial Muslim that Muslim
identity is securitized. Specifically, their religious identity racializes Muslims as a suspect race deserving of selective national security law enforcement, as opposed to a religious minority to be protected from religious
persecution by the state or public. 40 The series of articles interrogate the
claim that the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) has been manufacturing a purported “Muslim homegrown terrorism” threat since 2001. 41 The
legal and policy claims are based on an empirical review of the author’s
database of 612 federal terrorism-related cases against Muslim defendants
between 2001 and 2021. At least 282 are sting operations.42
The overarching normative claim of the article series is threefold.
First, unsubstantiated radicalization theories provide a blueprint for sting
operations targeting vulnerable Muslims wherein informants or undercover agents coerce or manipulate him into a government-led fake plot.
The US government points to these purportedly academic theories when
civil rights advocates and defense attorneys accuse it of religious profiling
in counterterrorism enforcement. By exposing the absence of credible,
empirically based research, this Article aims to debunk government claims
that facially neutral radicalization theory, not racial or religious animus,
justifies how they structure sting operations targeting Muslims.
Second, the Muslim men are selected based on their expressions of
extremist views on social media, which in turn become the basis for the
government proving the Muslim defendant was predisposed to commit
terrorism to counter entrapment defenses. Flaws in the entrapment doctrine implicate not only the liberty interests of sting operation targets, but
also the First Amendment right to express extremist speech.
Third, racialized counterterrorism leads to over-policing of Muslims
and under-policing of far-right wing Whites, thereby subjecting minorities
to White supremacist hate crimes and increasing politically motivated
39. Sahar F. Aziz, Policing Terrorists in the Community, 5 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J., 147 (2014)
[hereinafter Policing Terrorists in the Community]; Sahar F. Aziz, ‘Losing the War of Ideas’: A
Critique of Countering Violent Extremism Programs, 52 TEX. INT’L L.J. 255 (2017).
40. See SAHAR AZIZ, THE RACIAL MUSLIM: WHEN RACISM QUASHES RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM (2021).
41. This normative claim is made by others, including Aaron Treverson and the Coalition
on Civil Freedoms. However, this Article is the first to ground its normative claim in an
empirical study of 631 federal and state terrorism related prosecutions against Muslims from
2001 to 2021. The second article in the series is Sahar F. Aziz, Race, Entrapment and Manufacturing "Homegrown Terrorism" (forthcoming Georgetown L.J. 2023).
42. The database of 631 state and federal terrorism cases is on file with the author.
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violent crime against government targets. The consequences have been
devastating for Muslim communities, including individuals who lost their
liberty and Muslims across the country suspected by co-workers, neighbors, and the general public of being a fifth column sympathetic to foreign
terrorist organizations unless they can individually prove their innocence
in the court of public opinion. Put simply, Muslims and racial minorities
are less safe from private and state violence while our society is less secure
from domestic terrorism, arising from far-right wing ideology.
I. STATE MANUFACTURED TERRORISM CASES
The literature on radicalization theory falls into two analytical
frames—structural root causes and individual psychological cases. Among
the cacophony of articles, terrorism scholars agree that radicalization theory
remains speculative and uncorroborated by methodologically sound empirical research. 43 Nevertheless, the FBI has effectively weaponized radicalization research by deploying informants and agents to befriend Muslim
men who post videos and articles on social media glorifying terrorism, Al
Qaeda, Osama Bin Laden, Anwar Al-Awlaki, and the Islamic State of Iraq
and Syria (ISIS). Before the ubiquity of social media, the government
fished for their targets through physical surveillance of cafes frequented by
Muslim customers, mosques, and Muslim community organizations. 44
Starting in 2007, agents and informants shifted their search for sting operation targets to social media, online chat rooms, and websites promoting
political violence against civilians and Western military forces.45
In an overzealous and misguided effort to keep America safe, the FBI
resorts to deploying its formidable resources towards creating fake terrorists
out of bombastic and hapless men who spew extremist rhetoric. With each
43. See BRIAN A. JACKSON, ASHLEY L. RHOADES, JORDAN R. REIMER & NATASHA
LANDER, HOMELAND SECURITY OPERATIONAL ANALYSIS CENTER, PRACTICAL TERRORISM
PREVENTION: REEXAMINING U.S. NATIONAL APPROACHES TO ADDRESSING THE THREAT OF
IDEOLOGICALLY MOTIVATED VIOLENCE 1, 69 (2019) [hereinafter Practical Terrorism Prevention];
Jessica Stern, Radicalization to Extremism and Mobilization to Violence: What Have We Learned and
What Can We Do about It?,” ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI., 102 (2016); NAT’L
CONSORTIUM FOR THE STUDY OF TERRORISM AND RESPONSES TO TERRORISM, FINAL
REPORT: EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT OF DOMESTIC RADICALIZATION 7 (Dec. 2016); see also Paul
Gill, Towards a Scientific Approach to Identifying and Understanding Indicators of Radicalization and
Terrorist Intent: Eight Key Problems, 2 J. THREAT ASSESSMENT AND MGMT. 187 (2015); Randy
Borum, Radicalization into Violent Extremism I: A Review of Social Science Theories, 4 J. STRATEGIC
SECURITY 7 (2011).
44. ACLU, FACTSHEET: THE NYPD MUSLIM SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM, https://
www.aclu.org/other/factsheet-nypd-muslim-surveillance-program (last visited Oct. 25,
2021); Mansoor, supra note 8.
45. This conclusion is based on the analysis of the 256 sting operations cases in the author’s database of 631 state and federal terrorism cases against Muslim defendants.
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fake terrorist the government creates, it justifies demands for more public
funds to combat a supposed homegrown terrorist threat inflated by the
same entity asking for the funding. Moreover, the government’s sting operations demonstrate that their stated objective in ‘preventing terrorism’ is
neither rehabilitative nor remedial. Instead, counterterrorism is predatory—at the expense of Muslims’ collective civil liberties. 46
The racial politics of counterterrorism defines success not by the prevention of real terrorist plots, but rather the number of Muslim men the
government can put in jail regardless of how socially isolated, young, mentally ill, or otherwise incompetent they may be. In light of the broader
systemic racism in the criminal justice system that has been incarcerating
black and brown people for generations,47 this outcome should come as no
surprise. Indeed, counterterrorism is implemented by these same law enforcement agencies. As a result, the government’s stated goals of protecting
national security should be met with skepticism and rigorous analysis of the
underlying facts of each case.
The double standards are more glaring when compared to the leniency afforded to the tens of thousands of White far-right extremists engaging in similar bombastic, extremist rhetoric against Blacks, Latinos, Asians,
Jews, and Muslims. 48 Such leeway granted for over a decade culminated
in a siege on the Capitol on January 6, 2021 intended to halt Congress’
certification of Joe Biden as the 47th president of the United States. 49 It is
only after a white extremist kills Black or Jewish congregants that law

46. Jesse J. Norris, Accounting for the (Almost Complete) Failure of the Entrapment Defense in
Post-9/11 US Terrorism Cases, 45 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 194, 194-96 (2020).
47. See generally, MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION
IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2012).
48. Janet Reitman, U.S. Law Enforcement Failed to See the Threat of White Nationalism. Now
They Don’t Know How to Stop It, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 3, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com
/2018/11/03/magazine/FBI-charlottesville-white-nationalism-far-right.html; Trevor Aaronson,
Terrorism’s Double Standard: Violent Far Right-Extremists are Rarely Prosecuted as Terrorists, THE
INTERCEPT (Mar. 23, 2019), https://theintercept.com/2019/03/23/domestic-terrorism-fbiprosecutions/; Sebastian Rotella, Domestic Terrorism: A More Urgent Threat, but Weaker Laws,
PROPUBLICA (Jan. 7, 2021), https://www.propublica.org/article/domestic-terrorism-a-moreurgent-threat-but-weaker-laws.
49. Mark Mazzetti, Helene Cooper, Jennifer Steinhauer, Zolan Kanno-Youngs & Luke
Broadwater, Inside a Deadly Siege: How a String of Failures Led to a Dark Day at the Capitol,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 10, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/10/us/politics/capitolsiege-security.html; see also Andrew Selsky, Capitol Attack Reflects US Extremism Evolution
over Decades, AP NEWS (Jan. 23, 2021), https://apnews.com/article/capitol-siege-riotscoronavirus-pandemic-b7123f0a223c6ed8098a03b459120c83; Ryan Devereaux, Capitol
Attack Was Culmination of Generations of Far-Right Extremism, INTERCEPT (Jan. 23, 2021),
https://theintercept.com/2021/01/23/capitol-riot-far-right-extremism/.
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enforcement gets involved, reflecting a myopic view of racial violence as
outside the purview of preventive policing.50
As America experiences a racial awakening, the American public is
realizing law’s potency in furthering systems of oppression based on nefarious stereotypes of racial minorities as inferior, less intelligent, lazy, foreign,
and dangerous.51 A national anti-racism movement is challenging blind acceptance of legal doctrines, such as qualified immunity, that fail to take into
account the racial disparities arising from enforcement of facially-neutral
laws. 52 Counterterrorism law and policy are not exempt from structural
racism. For nearly two decades, anti-terrorism resources have been deployed in a way that securitizes, stigmatizes, and incarcerates Muslims who
hold ‘extremist’ political views—as well as religious Muslims who merely
refuse to fully assimilate how they practice their faith into Anglo-Saxon
Christian normativity. 53
While racialized law enforcement erodes the rule of law for all, the
consequences are grave for the four to six million Muslims in the United
States who experience myriad derivative harms from the collective
stigma. 54 Even if a Muslim is not directly targeted in a sting operation, the
continuous confirmation of stereotypes that Muslims are terrorists subjects
them to hate crimes, hateful speech, and discrimination in their lived experiences. 55 The pseudo-science of radicalization has played an outsized,
legitimizing role in the racial politics of counterterrorism.
50. Edward McAllister, Luciana Lopez & Alana Wise, Mourning Shooting Victims, Charleston
Anguishes over ‘Freshness of Death,’ REUTERS (June 20, 2015), https://www.reuters.com
/article/us-usa-shooting-south-carolina/mourning-shooting-victims-charleston-anguishesover-freshness-of-death-idUSKBN0OY06A20150621; see also Rachel Kaadzi Ghansaha, A
Most American Terrorist: The Making of Dylann Roof, GQ (Aug. 21, 2017), https://
www.gq.com/story/dylann-roof-making-of-an-american-terrorist; Nicole Chavez, Emanuella Grinberg & Eliott C. McLaughlin, Pittsburgh Synagogue Gunman Said He Wanted All
Jews to Die, Criminal Complaint Says, CNN (Oct. 31, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018
/10/28/us/pittsburgh-synagogue-shooting/index.html.
51. See generally, Julianna Menasce Horowitz, Anna Brown & Kiana Cox, Race in America 2019, PEW RES. CTR. (Apr. 9, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/social-trends/2019
/04/09/race-in-america-2019/.
52. Emily Cochrane & Luke Broadwater, Here Are the Differences Between the Senate and
House Bills to Overhaul Policing, N.Y. TIMES (June 17, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020
/06/17/us/politics/police-reform-bill.html.
53. See generally SAHAR Aziz, THE RACIAL MUSLIM: WHEN RACISM QUASHES
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (2021) (providing a theoretical frame for the racialization of Muslims
that produces a hierarchy of Racial Muslims wherein religious and dissident Muslims are
most likely to be targeted by the government’s sting operations).
54. Laura Silver, Moira Fagan, Aidan Connaughton & Mara Mordecai, Views about National Identity Becoming More Inclusive in U.S., Western Europe, PEW RES. CTR. 29 (May 5,
2021) https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2021/05/05/3-discrimination-in-society/.
55. Sahar F. Aziz, Policing Terrorists in the Community, 5 Harv. Nat’l Sec. L.J. 147, 187
(2014); Sahar F. Aziz, A Muslim Registry: The Precursor to Internment?, 2017 BYU L. REV
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II. THE RACIAL POLITICS OF PREVENTIVE COUNTERTERRORISM
Exposing the racialization of law entails debunking the myth that enforcement of facially neutral law cannot produce racist outcomes—a fundamental principle of critical race theory.56 In practice, dominant groups
receive the fullest protections of the law while minorities experience a
fraction of such rights. 57 Conversely, when it comes to laws that prohibit
or criminalize certain behaviors, minorities bear the brunt of maximum
enforcement while dominant groups’ infringements are treated as less serious, if not outright overlooked, and when enforced the penalties are more
lenient. 58 The result is a maximization of freedom, opportunity, and dignity for White Christians (the current dominant group) and incremental
denial of such rights for minorities depending on their similarity to Whiteness, Judeo-Christian identity, and cisgender maleness.59
Applying this critical race theory frame to counterterrorism law and
policy reveals glaring contradictions between the U.S. government’s treatment of Muslims and White Christians. Despite a reported sharp rise in
779, 783 (2017); Sahar F. Aziz, Coercive Assimilation: The Perils of Muslim Women’s Identity
Performance in the Workplace, 20 MICH. J. RACE & L., 1, 17 (2014).
56. DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF RACISM
(2018); see also PAUL BUTLER, CHOKEHOLD: POLICING BLACK MEN 45 (2017).
57. Id.
58. See, e.g., United States v. Jessica Louise Bustle, No. 1:21-cr-00238 (D.D.C.) (charged
with violating 40 U.S.C. §§ 5104(e)(2)(D), (G) and 18 U.S.C. §§ 1752(a)(1), (2), convicted
of 40 U.S.C. §§ 5104(e)(G) and sentenced to twenty-four months probation with sixty days
of home confinement); United States v. Andrew Ryan Bennett, No. 1:21-cr-227 (D.D.C.)
(charged with violating 40 U.S.C. §§ 5104(e)(2)(D), (G) and 18 U.S.C. §§ 1752(a)(1), (2),
convicted of 40 U.S.C. §§ 5104(e)(G) and sentenced to twenty-four months probation);
United States v. Michael Curzio, No. 1:21-cr-41 (D.D.C.) (charged with violating 40 U.S.C.
§§ 5104(e)(2)(D), (G) and 18 U.S.C. §§ 1752(a)(1), (2), convicted of 40 U.S.C. §§ 5104(e)(G)
and sentenced to six months in prison); United States v. Karl Dresch, No. 1:21-cr-71 (D.D.C.)
(charged with violating 40 U.S.C. §§ 5104(e)(2)(D), (G) and 18 U.S.C. §§ 1512(c)(2),
1752(a)(1), (2), convicted of 40 U.S.C. §§ 5104(e)(G) and sentenced to time served after
spending eight months in pretrial detention); United States v. Paul Allard Hodgkins, No.
1:21-cr-188 (D.D.C.) (charged with violating 40 U.S.C. §§ 5104(e)(2)(D), (G) and 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1752(a)(1), (2), convicted of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2) and sentenced to eight months prison);
United States v. Valerie Elaine Ehrke, No. 1:21-cr-97 (D.D.C.) (charged with violating 40
U.S.C. §§ 5104(e)(2)(D), (G) and 18 U.S.C. §§ 1752(a)(1), (2), convicted of 40 U.S.C. §§
5104(e)(G) and sentenced to three years probation); United States v. Robert Maurice Reeder,
No. 1:21-cr-166 (D.D.C) (charged with violating 40 U.S.C. §§ 5104(e)(2)(D), (G) and 18
U.S.C. §§ 1512(c)(2), 1752(a)(1), (2), convicted of 40 U.S.C. §§ 5104(e)(G) and sentenced
to three months prison).
59. The legal academic literature is replete with examples in the criminal justice context
wherein Black men and women are over-policed and criminalized at a systemic level, resulting in significant over-representation of minorities in prison. See, e.g., ALEXANDER,
supra note 47; BUTLER, supra note 56; ANGELA J. DAVIS, POLICING THE BLACK MAN:
ARREST, PROSECUTION, AND IMPRISONMENT (2017).
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far-right extremist groups, radio stations, websites, and leaders with tens of
millions of White followers, the government did not allocate sufficient resources toward the consequent politically motivated violence. 60 Indeed,
when a U.S. Department of Homeland Security intelligence report in 2009
warned of the rise in right-wing extremism, conservative politicians condemned it as an assault on the freedom of speech and association.61
In stark contrast, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)’s budget
has more than tripled from $3 billion in 1999 to $10 billion in 2021. The
influx in funds has facilitated the FBI’s primary focus on Muslim communities over the past twenty years. 62 In 2019, the FBI spent nearly $3.7 billion on counterterrorism, which after 9/11 became a top priority to its 564
field offices and thousands of agents throughout the country. 63 In 2021,
the FBI’s total annual budget for domestic and international

60. See SETH G. JONES, CATRINA DOXSEE & NICHOLAS HARRINGTON, The Escalating
Terrorism Problem in the United States, CSIS BRIEFS (June 2020), https://csis-website-prod
.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/200612_Jones_DomesticTerrorism_v6.pdf;
Vincent A. Auger, Right-Wing Terror: A Fifth Global Wave?, 14 PERSPS. ON TERRORISM 87
(2020); Nadia Banteka, The Rise of the Extreme Right and the Crime of Terrorism: Ideology,
Mobilization, and the Case of the Golden Dawn, 29 DUKE J. OF COMP. & INT’L L. 127 (2019);
but see FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION & DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., SECURITY
STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT AND DATA ON DOMESTIC TERRORISM (May
2021), https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/fbi-dhs-domestic-terrorism-strategic-report.pdf
/view.
61. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., RIGHTWING EXTREMISM: CURRENT ECONOMIC AND
POLITICAL CLIMATE FUELING RESURGENCE IN RADICALIZATION AND RECRUITMENT
(Apr. 7, 2009), https://fas.org/irp/eprint/rightwing.pdf; Brian Montopoli, DHS Report
Warns of Right Wing Extremists, CBS NEWS (Apr. 14, 2009), https://www.cbsnews.com
/news/dhs-report-warns-of-right-wing-extremists; Homeland Security Chief Apologizes to
Veteran Groups, CNN (Apr. 16, 2009), https://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/04/16
/napolitano.apology; 155 CONG. REC. 10415-10422 (2009) (statement of Rep. John
Carter); Brett Murphy, Will Carless, Marisa Kwiatkowski & Tricia L. Nadolny, A 2009
Warning about Right-Wing Extremism Was Engulfed by Politics. There Are Signs It’s Happening
Again, USA TODAY (Jan. 25, 2021), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/investigations
/2021/01/25/twelve-years-before-capitol-riot-warning-right-wing-extremism-buried
/6658284002.
62. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., BUDGET TREND DATA 1975 – 2003 97 (Spring 2002),
https://www.justice.gov/archive/jmd/1975_2002/2002/pdf/BudgetTrand.pdf; FED.
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, FY 2019 BUDGET REQUEST AT A GLANCE (2018), https://
www.justice.gov/jmd/page/file/1033146/download; FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, FY
2022 BUDGET REQUEST AT A GLANCE, https://www.justice.gov/jmd/page/file/1399031
/download.
63. See GERMAN, supra note 35, at 4–5; AARONSON, supra note 7, at 44 (noting that there
may be 40,000 informants working for the FBI); see also FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
FY 2020 BUDGET REQUEST AT A GLANCE (2020), https://www.justice.gov/jmd/page/file
/1142426/download.
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counterterrorism and counterintelligence surpassed $4 billion. That is forty
percent of its total $10 billion budget.64
The Department of Justice requested an additional $100 million in
2022 for domestic counterterrorism enforcement, of which $45 million
will be added to the FBI’s current $292 million annual budget for domestic
terrorism. 65 The FBI’s counterterrorism priority remains to ferret out
(Muslim) “Homegrown Violent Extremism” in the homeland; and only
after the U.S. Capitol was seized by White far-right wing extremists did
the FBI take more seriously the threat of what it calls “Domestic Violent
Extremism” (DVE). 66 Tellingly, the agency requested and increase of
merely $45 million to counter DVE.67
The skewed allocation of counterterrorism funds has predictably
translated into massive government surveillance and sting operations targeting mosques, charities, and Muslim leaders for nearly twenty years. 68
Eventually, the FBI discovered there were few Muslim terrorists to be
found in the United States. 69 Instead of shifting their resources accordingly, the cases in the author’s database show that the FBI resorted to manufacturing terrorist plots using dubious informants and over-zealous undercover agents looking for “radicalized” young Muslim men in internet
chat rooms and social media forums to ensnare in a sting operation. 70 And
when they could not find them, government agents enticed them into a
fake plot.
64. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, FY 2022 BUDGET REQUEST AT A GLANCE (2021),
https://www.justice.gov/jmd/page/file/1399031/download;https://www.justice.gov/jmd
/page/file/1399031/download; Federal Bureau of Investigation Budget Request for Fiscal Year
2022: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Com., Just., Sci., and Related Agencies of the Sen. Comm.
on Appropriations, 117th Cong. (June 23, 2021) (statement of FBI Director Christopher Wray),
https://www.appropriations.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Wray%20Witness%20Testimony3.pdf.
65. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, FY 2022 BUDGET REQUEST AT A GLANCE (2021),
https://www.justice.gov/jmd/page/file/1399031/download; see generally U.S. DEP’T OF
JUST., FY 2022 BUDGET REQUEST AT A GLANCE (2021), https://www.justice.gov/jmd/page
/file/1398931/download.
66. Federal Bureau of Investigation Budget Request for Fiscal Year 2022: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Com., Just., Sci., and Related Agencies of the Sen. Comm. on Appropriations, 117th Cong.
2 (2021) (statement of Director Christopher Wray), https://www.appropriations.senate.gov
/imo/media/doc/Wray%20Witness%20Testimony3.pdf.
67. Id. at 6.
68. See Sahar F. Aziz, Caught in a Preventive Dragnet: Selective Counterterrorism in a Post-9
/11 America, 47 GONZ. L. REV. 429 (2011).
69. See JONES et. al, supra note 60.
70. It is no coincidence that the government’s tactics mirror explanations by popular counterterrorism experts, such as Marc Sageman’s, about how homegrown terrorism arises from
computer-mediated communication such as chat rooms and social media messaging forums.
See, e.g., MARC SAGEMAN, LEADERLESS JIHAD: TERROR NETWORKS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY 113–14 (2008) (claiming online radicalization occurs in chat rooms, listservs, and
forums) [hereinafter LEADERLESS JIHAD].
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The political economy of counterterrorism coupled with specious
radicalization theories has resulted in the prosecution of at least 630 Muslims (all male except for four female defendants) from 2001 to 2021. 71 To
be sure, some of the cases are legitimate sting operations wherein, for example, a defendant had committed a predicate act prior to the initiation of
the sting operation or the defendant was actively searching to join a terrorist organization when the informant or undercover agent made contact. 72 However, at least 345 cases raise concerns with the criminalization
of “extremist” speech and ideas. 73 That is, the defendant was not taking
any action nor was he in a realistic position to do so but for the government
actor’s actively leading him into a fake plot designed and implemented by
the government. This manufacturing of crime is explained in part by the
racial politics of preventive counterterrorism.
Terrorism prevention has proven both lucrative for the FBI and professionally advantageous for its agents after the September 11th terrorist
attacks. Annual budgetary increases, agent promotions, and fame incentivize aggressive counterterrorism enforcement, at the expense of Muslims’
collective civil liberties. Similar to drug and gun criminal enforcement
against African American communities, the more money is funneled to
counterterrorism, the more agents will find what they are looking for. 74
And if they can’t find real security threats, the agents manufacture them.75
The billions of dollars spent over two decades on these fake terrorist plots
have yielded at least 612 federal indictments of Muslims, in addition to
thousands of counterterrorism investigations. 76 While this may facially

71. The database of these 631 state and federal cases is on file with the author.
72. See, e.g., United States v. Ahmed, 1:10-cr-00413 (E.D. Va. 2010); United States v.
Grecula, 4:05-00257 (S.D. Tex. 2005); United States v. Edmonds, 1:15-cr-00149 (N.D.
Ill. 2015).
73. According to the author’s coding of cases, approximately 300 cases appear to be
legitimate based on the following criteria: 1) defendant engaged in predicate acts without
coercion or manipulation by a government operative; 2) informant or undercover agent
followed the lead of the defendant rather than leading, creating, and implementing the fake
plot; and 3) defendant rebuked explicit offers to withdraw from the plot.
74. Jesse J. Norris, Explaining the Emergence of Entrapment in Post-9/11 Terrorism Investigations, 27 CRITICAL CRIMINOLOGY 467, 470 (2019) (citing KAI T. ERIKSON, WAYWARD
PURITANS: A STUDY IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF DEVIANCE (1966) for the proposition that
“[s]ociologists observed long ago that the amount of deviance discovered rises in proportion
to the number of those employed to find it”).
75. Trevor Aaronson, THE TERROR FACTORY: INSIDE THE FBI’S MANUFACTURED
WAR ON TERRORISM 16-17 (2013).
76. Trial and Terror, INTERCEPT, https://trial-and-terror.theintercept.com/ (last visited
Jan. 31, 2021) (noting there have been 975 defendants prosecuted by the U.S. Department
of Justice since the 9/11 attacks). The author’s database shows at least six hundred and
thirty terrorism related cases have been brought against Muslims. Practical Terrorism Prevention, supra note 43, 215 n.30 (citing various media reports between 2011 and 2018
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appear to be an indication of success, a closer look at the cases reveals a
troubling trend. Most Muslim male targets are young, easily manipulated,
and otherwise vulnerable due to mental illness, indigence, unemployment,
recent release from prison, or social isolation. 77 Easy targets combined with
tremendous political pressures and financial incentives to prevent terrorism
produces a predictable outcome that repeats the FBI’s checkered history of
racial profiling against minorities and dissidents.78
Long before 2001, the FBI’s mission encompassed countering domestic terrorism. J. Edgar Hoover infamously targeted African Americans,
Jews, and immigrants that effectively criminalized their political dissent. 79
After more than three decades of systematic deployment of informant infiltrators and agents provocateurs in sting operations against so-called radicals in COINTELPRO, these abuses were exposed in the 1975 Church
Committee Hearings. 80 What followed was a series of legislative reforms
that constrained the federal government’s ability to surveil and sabotage
political groups.81 After 9/11, the FBI’s authorities were expanded by the
PATRIOT Act and the FBI’s Domestic Investigations and Operation
Guide (DIOG), prompting civil liberties groups to decry a regression to
the criminalization of political dissent. 82
While an extensive critique of the PATRIOT Act is beyond the
scope of this article, it is worth highlighting how the 2008 changes to the
FBI’s DIOG granted the agency license to racially and religiously profile
Muslims in aggressive sting operations that have posed grave threats to their
liberty interests. 83 In section 4 of the DIOG, the FBI stated that it would
estimating counterterrorism threat assessments between 10,000 to 20,000 annually and investigations between 2,000 and 3,000 annually).
77. Jessica Stern, Radicalization to Extremism and Mobilization to Violence: What Have We
Learned and What Can We Do about It?, 668 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI., 102,
109 (noting that underemployment is a risk factor cited in multiple studies of ISIS recruits).
78. S. REP. NO. 94-755 (1976); see generally NELSON BLACKSTOCK, COINTELPRO: THE
FBI’S SECRET WAR ON POLITICAL FREEDOM (1988) (examining how the FBI’s
COINTELPRO targeted political dissidents and Black nationalists).
79. Virgie Hoban, ‘Discredit, Disrupt, and Destroy’: FBI Records Acquired by the Library
Reveal Violent Surveillance of Black Leaders, Civil Rights Organizations, BERKELEY LIBR. NEWS
(Jan. 18, 2021), https://news.lib.berkeley.edu/fbi.
80. S. REP. NO. 94-755 (1976).
81. Thomas Young, 40 Years Ago, Church Committee Investigated Americans Spying on
Americans, BROOKINGS (May 6, 2015), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/brookings-now
/2015/05/06/40-years-ago-church-committee-investigated-americans-spying-on-americans/.
82. ACLU, UNLEASED AND UNACCOUNTABLE: THE FBI’S UNCHECKED ABUSE OF
AUTHORITY 4-7, 14 (2013).
83. Anik Joshi, The United States Doesn’t Need Another Rushed Patriot Act, FOREIGN POL’Y
(Jan. 19, 2021), https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/01/19/us-capitol-fbi-new-patriot-act-security-state/; Brad Polumbo, Tulsi Gabbard Warns Against the Danger of New ‘Domestic Terrorism’ Laws, FEE (Jan. 27, 2021), https://fee.org/articles/tulsi-gabbard-warns-against-thedanger-of-new-domestic-terrorism-laws/; Jack Kelly, A Consequence of COVID-19 Could Be
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use the least intrusive methods to protect the American people, and that
“no investigative activity, including assessments, may be taken solely on the
basis of activities that are protected by the First Amendment or on the race,
ethnicity, national origin or religion of the subject.” 84 In the same breath,
the DIOG provides guidance on the use of race or ethnicity, explicitly
permitting the use of ethnicity in evaluating whether an individual is or is
not “a possible associate of a criminal or terrorist group that is known to
be comprised of members of the same ethnic grouping . . . .” 85 When it
comes to using race or ethnicity in communities, the DIOG allows broad
collection and analyzing of demographics, geo-mapping ethnic/racial demographics, collection of general ethnic/racial behavior as long as there is
a “rational relationship” to an investigation or analytical need, among other
broadly defined parameters. 86
Equipped with broad investigative authority and pressured by elected
officials to show results from their increased budgets, FBI agents have successfully incarcerated hundreds of Muslim men using sting operations.
Moreover, as Jesse Norris’ research shows, former FBI agents admit that an
agent involved in counterterrorism operations gets a “‘gold star by their
name that . . . they were a great terrorist hunter.’”87 Agents also noted the
importance of receiving a press release for their cases as a means of bolstering their careers. 88 Similarly, a terrorism expert interviewed by Norris
stated that agents need to “‘work a terrorism case ‘“ in order to be promoted and become a “‘golden boy ‘“ in the department eligible for fasttrack promotions. 89 These perverse incentives have caused defense counsel
to accuse the FBI of engaging in sentencing entrapment wherein agents

A Loss of Civil Liberties – Resulting In Career Restrictions, FORBES (Apr. 24, 2020), https://
www.forbes.com/sites/jackkelly/2020/04/24/a-consequence-of-covid-19-could-be-a-loss-ofcivil-liberties-and-the-implementation-of-career-restrictions/?sh=4b3f10ae3f29.
84. FBI, FBI DOMESTIC INVESTIGATIONS AND OPERATIONS GUIDE (DIOG) 2008
VERSION TRAINING MATERIAL AND RELATED DOCUMENTS PART 04 OF 05 at 22 (2008),
https://vault.fbi.gov/FBI%20Domestic%20Investigations%20and%20Operations%20Guide%
20%28DIOG%29/diog-section-4-2008-version-training-material-and-related-documents
/fbi-domestic-investigations-and-operations-guide-diog-2008-version-training-material-andrelated-documents-part-04-of-05/view (stating that whether an FBI agent’s conduct is intrusive is evaluated by five factors: the nature of the information sought, the scope of the information sought, the scope of the use of the investigative method, the source of the information
sought, and the risk of public exposure) (emphasis added).
85. Id. at 25.
86. Id.
87. See Norris, supra note 74, at 476.
88. Id.
89. Id.

142

Michigan Journal of Race & Law

[VOL. 27:1

manipulate their vulnerable Muslim targets to commit the most serious
(fake) terrorist plot in order to maximize the potential sentence. 90
The politics of preventive counterterrorism puts FBI agents and prosecutors in the position of determining how to go about finding terrorists
in the United States. As a former prosecutor noted, “There isn’t a business
of terrorism in the United States… You’re not going to be able to go to a
street corner and find someone who’s already blown something up … The
. . . goal is not to find somebody who’s already engaged in terrorism but
find somebody who would jump at the opportunity if a real terrorist
showed up in town.” 91 This is where radicalization theories not only inform counterterrorism sting operations, but serve as a blueprint for the FBI
to replicate those theories with little regard for the scholarly consensus that
they are unsubstantiated, and therefore unreliable. 92
III. THE PSEUDO-SCIENCE OF RADICALIZATION
Radicalization theory developed from scholars’ attempts to understand the causes of terrorism, especially transnational terrorism. According
to former CIA analyst and oft-cited terrorism expert Marc Sageman, transnational terrorism has undergone three waves.93 The first wave was comprised of hierarchical organizations engaging in asymmetrical conflict with
nation-states. 94 Well-funded, geographically focused, and consisting of local fighters trained to conduct violent operations against civilians, organizations such as Hizbullah, Hamas, Tamil Tigers, and Laishkar-e-Taeba presented counterterrorism researchers with a variation of other terrorist
organizations such as the Irish Republican Army, the Italian Red Brigades,
and the Spanish ETA (Euskadi Ta Askatasuna). 95
90. See U.S. v. Siraj, 468 F. Supp. 2d 408, 414 (E.D.N.Y. 2007); U.S. v. Cromitie, 781
F. Supp. 2d 211, 215-20 (S.D.N.Y. 2009); U.S. v. Osmakac, 868 F.3d 937, 958-60 (11th
Cir. 2017); U.S. v. Hamzeh, No. 16-CR-21, 2019 WL 1331639, at *1 (E.D. Wis. Mar.
25, 2019); see also Norris, supra note 74, at 476.
91. David K. Shipler, Terrorist Plots, Hatched by the F.B.I., N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 29, 2012),
https://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/29/opinion/sunday/terrorist-plots-helped-along-bythe-fbi.html (quoting David Raskin, former federal terrorism prosecutor).
92. See SAGEMAN, supra note 27, at 575 (noting the “ocean of false alarms” that overwhelm law enforcement agencies trying to find so-called jihadi plots which then incentivizes agents to use sting operations); HORGAN, supra note 34, at 3.
93. LEADERLESS JIHAD, supra note 70, at 48–50.
94. Id. at 48.
95. See. id. at 49-49; see also Kali Robinson, What is Hezbollah?, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN
REL. (Oct. 26, 2021, 4:00 PM), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-hezbollah (detailing structure and funding); see also Zachary Laub & Kali Robinson, What is Hamas?,
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (Aug. 17, 2021, 1:30 PM), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-hamas (detailing structure and funding); see also STAN. CTR. INT’L.
SECURITY & COOPERATION, LIBERATION TIGERS OF TAMIL ELAM (July 8, 2015), https://
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The second wave of transnational terrorism began in the 1990s when
organizations such as Al Qaeda recruited both local and foreign fighters to
be trained in terrorist attacks across borders for the purpose of creating a
transnational Caliphate – in contrast to the first wave groups’ ethno-nationalist secession or creation of an independent state within a nationstate. 96 From its headquarters in Afghanistan, Al Qaeda leaders coordinated
attacks against civilians in Muslim-majority countries and their Western
state allies, which culminated in the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. 97
The third wave emerged after 2003 when the US unlawfully invaded
Iraq and continued its offensive against Al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan. 98 As Al Qaeda leaders were killed, detained, or constantly on the run,
they relied on an individual or small group of individuals to self-train and
independently plan a terrorist attack inspired by the organization’s propaganda and ideology. 99 This third wave has come to be known as ‘homegrown terrorism’ and lone wolf terrorism in the counterterrorism parlance. 100 Western nations’ responses to third wave transnational terrorism
has generated a cottage industry of radicalization experts and pseudo-intellectual theories that psycho-analyze and dissect Muslim diaspora communities like rats in a lab experiment—all under the guise of preventing
web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/print_view/225#:~:text=Overseas%20funding%20is%20mainly%20provided,%2C%20Europe%2C%20and%20North%
20America (detailing structure and funding); see also STAN. CTR. INT’L. SECURITY &
COOPERATION, LASHKAR-E-TAIBA (NOV. 2018), HTTPS://CISAC.FSI.STANFORD.EDU
/MAPPINGMILITANTS/PROFILES/LASHKAR-E-TAIBA#HIGHLIGHT_TEXT_12559 (detailing
structure and funding).
96. See id. at 49 (The congregation of foreign fighters from various countries to Afghanistan ultimately culminated in a push for an Islamic caliphate to protect against perceived
Western Christendom’s persecution of Muslim diasporas and imperialism of Muslim-majority countries.).
97. Id. at 134-35.
98. See generally Mark Shulman & Lawrence J. Lee, The Legality and Constitutionality of
the President’s Authority to Initiate an Invasion of Iraq, 41 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L., 15 (2002);
see also Andreas Paulus, The War Against Iraq and the Future of International Law: Hegemony or
Pluralism?, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 691, 692, 695-713 (2004) (noting that “by acting without the blessing of the Security Council, the U.S.-led coalition was in breach of international law and the U.N. Charter. . . .”).
99. C.f. Al Qaeda, ADL, https://www.adl.org/resources/profiles/al-qaeda (“Following
the toppling of the Taliban in 2001 by the U.S., and its subsequent military campaigns in
Afghanistan, Al Qaeda’s operational methods and capabilities became more decentralized
and its ties to other groups became a correspondingly larger aspect of its operations.”) (last
visited Mar. 27, 2022).
100. LEADERLESS JIHAD, supra note 70, at 133—35; see also Khaled A. Beydoun, Lone Wolf
Terrorism: Types, Stripes and Double Standards, 112 NW. L. REV. 187, 194 (2018) (defining
“lone wolf terrorism” as “premeditated violence unleashed by an individual actor, driven
by discretely held views or a cogent ideology espoused by an organization. A lone wolf
terrorist may be loosely connected to a (formally designated) terrorist organization or hate
group or act entirely in a solitary capacity.”).
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terrorism. This Article’s critique of radicalization schemas focuses on this
third wave.
Notwithstanding the hubris and fearmongering surrounding homegrown terrorism, the fact remains that a tiny percentage of people who
hold ‘radical’ views engage in terrorism. 101 Yet, the literature is awash in
theories, models, and concepts attempting to explain what causes terrorism,
who becomes a terrorist, and why people engage in terrorism. Due to the
complexity and heterogeneity of terrorism across time, space, and cultures,
there exists no overarching theoretical frame. As a result, U.S. law enforcement seeking to winnow down which individuals warrant investigation
often rely on negative racial stereotypes and political expedience—an entrenched practice in the American criminal justice system—that prompts a
focus on Muslim men as terrorist suspects. 102
Radicalization theory plays an outsized role in shaping counterterrorism enforcement. Commonly described as “what goes on before the
bomb goes off,” 103 radicalization is purportedly “the social and psychological process of incrementally experienced commitment to extremist political or religious ideology.” 104 While law enforcement officials are quick to
point out that radicalization does not necessarily lead to violence, they
nevertheless structure their sting operations to target Muslims who express
views outside the mainstream. 105 Worse yet, the objective of informants
and undercover agents apparently is to transition their Muslim targets who
express “extremist” political views toward violence through involvement
with a (fake) member of a terrorist group or engaging in lone wolf violence
through a (fake) terrorist plot. Put simply, the state is sponsoring violent
radicalization.
What the sting operations demonstrate is that the government cultivates the Muslim targets throughout fake terrorist plots to produce a ‘fully
fledged’ terrorist ripe for indictment, prosecution, and incarceration. The
methodical means by which these predatory law enforcement schemes are
conducted alarmingly mirror the processes offered by scholars in the radicalization literature, 106 the radicalization literature has become a blueprint
for counterterrorism sting operations. When coupled with weak
101. JOHN HORGAN, WALKING AWAY FROM TERRORISM: ACCOUNTS OF DISENGAGEMENT
FROM RADICAL AND EXTREMIST MOVEMENTS 3 (2009); Randy Borum, Radicalization into Violent Extremism II: A Review of Conceptual Models and Empirical Research, 4 J. STRATEGIC SECURITY
37, 38 (2011) (noting that most people who hold radical views do not engage in terrorism).
102. See generally ALEXANDER, supra note 47; see also BUTLER, supra note 56.
103. Mark Sedgwick, The Concept of Radicalization as a Source of Confusion, 22 TERRORISM
& POL. VIOLENCE 479, 479 (2010).
104. John Horgan & Kurt Braddock, Rehabilitating the Terrorists? Challenges in Assessing the
Effectiveness of Deradicalisation Programs, 22 TERRORISM & POL. VIOLENCE 267, 279 (2010).
105. Aaronson & Abowd, supra note 7.
106. See id. at 144–45 (2009); see also SAGEMAN, supra note 37, at 107-21.
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entrapment law (the topic of the next article in the series), the government
has been wildly successful in convicting 99% of the 631 Muslims charged
in terrorism related cases.107
To describe radicalization theory as still nascent and under-developed
is an understatement. 108 Indeed, some scholars describe it as more pseudointellectual than empirically grounded. 109 Before 2001, the term radicalization was only occasionally referenced in academia. Instead, researchers
focused on the causes of terrorism in the context of civil wars, anti-colonialist wars, domestic insurgencies, or inter-state conflicts. Despite Western scholars’ publications of hundreds of articles, chapters and books attempting to explain why and how individuals become terrorists, neither
law enforcement nor scholars can predict who is more or less likely to
engage in political violence. 110
After the September 11th terrorist attacks, researchers offered myriad
speculative theories attempting to explain how a person is ‘radicalized’ to
join a terrorist organization or conduct a “lone wolf” terrorist act. 111 The
few research projects grounded in empirical data are case studies with limited explanatory insights that can be translated into a reliable predictive
theory or empirical model.
As Arun Kundnani notes, the study of radicalization is not so much
about the search for the cause of terrorism, but more precisely, why “some
individual Muslims support an extremist interpretation of Islam that leads
to violence?” 112 The emphasis on Muslims and the individual de-emphasizes the wider political, economic, and social circumstances—what is often
referred to as the root causes—and makes Muslims an axiomatically suspect
community. Meanwhile, the government gives broad leeway to White
Christian individuals and groups who spew equally extremist, politically
107. See AZIZ, Race, Entrapment, and Manufacturing “Homegrown Terrorism,” supra
note 41 (examining how weak entrapment doctrine across federal circuits facilitates theuseof predatory
stingoperationsagainstMuslims).
108. Borum, supra note 34, at 38 (noting that few radicalization studies have been subject
to rigorous or systematic study).
109. HORGAN, supra note 101, at 5.
110. Cf. ALEX PETER SCHMID & RONALD D. CRELINSTEN, WESTERN RESPONSES TO
TERRORISM 11 (1993) (noting that terrorists seek to exploit people’s emotions by causing
them extreme anxiety so that they may become a victim of arbitrary violence).
111. See RONALD D. CRELINSTEN, COUNTERTERRORISM 196–97 (2009) (noting that an
international panel of leading terrorism experts in 2003 could not agree on the root causes
of terrorism and whether they were socio-economic-political structures or individual psychological); see also Jonathan Githens-Mazer & Robert Lambert, Why Conventional Wisdom
on Radicalization Fails: the Persistence of a Failed Discourse, 86 INT’L AFF. 889, 889-91 (2010)
(noting how radicalization theory is “plagued by assumption and intuition, unhappily dominated by ‘conventional wisdom’ rather than systematic scientific and empirically based research.”).
112. Kundnani, supra note 34, at 5.
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dissident rhetoric under the guise of freedom of speech and expression. 113
One need only look at the attempted insurgency on January 6, 2021 by
White extremists to find the glaring racialized double standards.114
Lacking empirical evidence, so-called radicalization experts make unfounded and biased assumptions about Muslim diasporic youth that merge
disparate concepts of “disaffection, radical dissent, religious fundamentalism, and propensity for violence” to justify surveilling Muslim communities within the broader preventive counterterrorism regime. 115 For example, the popular “staircase to terrorism” model proffered by Fathali
Moghaddam argues that feelings of discontent, perceived adversity or deprivation, and frustrations from individuals’ unsuccessful attempts to improve their situation are the first and second steps on the path to terrorism. 116 As a result, Lee Jarvis bluntly critiques radicalization theories as a
means for criminalizing “those who espouse alternative theories of political
legitimacy,” resulting in over-inclusive national security practices. 117 Despite documented limitations, radicalization theories continue to contribute to a systematic criminalization of Muslims with extreme political beliefs
and speech as potential terrorists.
Radicalization theories fall under two analytical frames: 1) structural
analysis focused on the socio-economic-political contexts where terrorism
occurs, also known as the root causes model, and 2) psychological models
focused on the individual mindset and life of terrorists. 118 A few scholars,
such as John Hogan and Max Taylor, combine the two models to assert
that the reasons a person becomes involved in terrorism lie within the
113. See S. POVERTY L. CTR., INTELLIGENCE REPORT: RAGE AGAINST CHANGE: WHITE
SUPREMACY FLOURISHES AMID FEARS OF IMMIGRATION AND NATION’S SHIFTING
DEMOGRAPHICS 1, 14-16, 32, 39 (Spring 2019), https://www.splcenter.org/sites/default
/files/intelligence_report_166.pdf; see also Rashawn Ray, What the Capitol Insurgency
Reveals About White Supremacy and Law Enforcement, BROOKINGS (Jan. 12, 2021), https://
www.brookings.edu/blog/how-we-rise/2021/01/12/what-the-capitol-insurgency-revealsabout-white-supremacy-and-law-enforcement/; Walter Griffin, Report: ‘Dirty Bomb’ Parts
Found in Slain Man’s Home, BANGOR DAILY NEWS (Feb. 10, 2009, 10:22 PM), http://
new.bangordailynews.com/2009/02/10/politics/report-dirty-bomb-parts-found-in-slainmans-home/; Michael Brick, Man Crashes Plane into Texas I.R.S. Office, N.Y. TIMES (Feb.
19, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/19/us/19crash.html; Joan Walsh, Why So
Little Attention to Vernon Hunter?, SALON (Feb. 23, 2010, 3:23 AM), https://www.salon.com
/2010/02/23/vernon_hunter/.
114. See Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, About, https://january6th.house.gov/about (last visited Nov. 20, 2021).
115. Kundnani, supra note 34, at 9; see also id.
116. Fathali M. Moghaddam, The Staircase to Terrorism: A Psychological Exploration, 60 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 161, 162-64 (2005).
117. Charlotte Heath-Kelly, Counter-terrorism: The Ends of a Secular Ministry, in CRITICAL
PERSPECTIVES ON COUNTER-TERRORISM 41, 50-51 (Lee Jarvis & Michael Lister eds.,
2015).
118. HORGAN, supra note 101, at 3.
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“psychological and emotional context of the individual on which the bigger and essentially non-psychological forces of opportunity and context
operate.” 119 Although both the structure and psychological models aim to
predict who is most likely to become a terrorist for purposes of assisting
law enforcement in preventive counterterrorism, neither set of theories is
substantiated by empirical research beyond small numbers of case studies
in dissimilar political and social contexts.120
Nevertheless, law enforcement adopts the radicalization framework
to identify their sting operation targets based on the unproven premise that
if an undercover agent does not recruit him, then a real terrorist will. 121
Before turning to the logical and factual flaws of this position, a review of
the radicalization literature reveals the internal justifications for the FBI’s
predatory and racialized sting operations. Any legal reforms aimed to protect defendants’ constitutional rights in terrorism related prosecutions,
therefore, must also expose the speciousness of the radicalization theories
on which post-911 preventive counterterrorism in general, and sting operations in particular, are built.
A. Socio-Economic-Political Structural Models
Structural counterterrorism looks at the root causes of terrorism to
understand why an individual partakes in political violence. 122 These models examine the social, economic, and political factors of a terrorist’s environment. Accordingly, poverty, lack of education, authoritarianism, human rights violations, political repression, an absence of the rule of law, and
inequality allegedly contribute to political violence by non-state actors and
their followers. 123
119. Max Taylor & John Horgan, A Conceptual Framework for Addressing Psychological Process in the Development of the Terrorist, 18 TERRORISM & POL. VIOLENCE 585, 588 (2006)
(identifying personal factors, setting events, and the social, political, and organizational context as the three critical process variables that affect the development of the terrorist).
120. Derek M.D. Silva, Police and Radicalization, in THE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL
CONTROL 249, 250 (Mathieu Deflem ed., 2018).
121. Id. at 251; Sageman, supra note 27, at 567.
122. David Rapoport argues there are four waves of terrorism since the late 1870 that
include 1) anarchists, 2) anticolonialists, 3) leftists, and 4) religious fundamentalists. DAVID
C. RAPOPORT, THE FOUR WAVES OF MODERN TERRORISM 6-7 (2004); see also JOHN
HORGAN, PSYCHOLOGY OF TERRORISM 85 (2004) (listing fourteen root causes frequently
cited by terrorism experts such as lack of democracy, civil liberties and the rule of law; failed
or weak states; rapid modernization; illegitimate or corrupt governments; repression by
foreign occupation or colonial powers; and historical antecedents of political violence, civil
wars, revolutions, dictatorships or occupation).
123. Quan Li & Drew Schaub, Economic Globalization and Transnational Terrorism: A Pooled
Time-series Analysis, 48 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 230, 237 (2004) (posing multiple critiques of
Kruger and Male«ková’s 2002 study that found no correlation between poverty and
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The rational actor theory examines terrorism in conflict zones or
countries experiencing insurgencies to posit that non-state actors fighting
an asymmetrical war with a nation-state, organizations such as Hamas,
Hezbullah, Al Qaeda, and ISIS choose terrorism to achieve specific military
objectives or political concessions from the state. 124 In his book Dying to
Win, Robert Pape argues that modern suicide missions are an extreme,
strategic rational decision in pursuit of national liberation or other political
goals. 125 To use economic parlance, a terrorist groups’ cost-benefit analysis
results in the use of limited resources to maximize its goal of defeating its
enemy. 126 Other scholars posit that ideological factors such as religious
fundamentalism, anti-capitalism, Marxism, xenophobia, hyper-nationalism, or racism drive political violence.127
Which model a country follows influences its counterterrorism strategy, especially in its international counterterrorism efforts. For example,
adoption of the socio-economic theories tends to produce a development
and rights-based approach to preventing terrorism, while the ideological
theories lead to a militarized response to foreign terrorist organizations. 128
terrorism at the individual level in Hezbollah suicide missions); Katerina Dalacoura, Democracy as Counter-Terrorism in the Middle East: A Red Herring?, 32 ULUSLARARASI GLIfKILER
KONSEYI GKTISADI GfLETMESI 101, 103 (2012) [hereinafter Democracy as Counter-Terrorism]
(arguing that materialist or structural factors drive Islamic terrorism because ideas are epiphenomenal to the underlying reasons); see also KATERINA DALACOURA, ISLAMIST
TERRORISM AND DEMOCRACY IN THE MIDDLE EAST 24–52 (2011) (noting ideational, material, and structural causes of terrorism).
124. Martha Crenshaw, The Logic of Terrorism: Terrorist Behaviour as a Product of Strategic
Choice, in ORIGINS OF TERRORISM: PSYCHOLOGIES, IDEOLOGIES, THEOLOGIES, STATES OF
MIND 7, 16 (WALTER REICH ED., 1998); Democracy as Counter-Terrorism, supra note 123, at
106.
125. ROBERT PAPE, DYING TO WIN: THE STRATEGIC LOGIC OF SUICIDE TERRORISM
23 (2006); see also JOHN HORGAN, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF TERRORISM 13 (2014) (explaining that the immediate aim of terrorist violence is creating a general climate of fear and
uncertainty through intimidation, injury, or death but that the ultimate aim is political
change as espoused by the terrorist group’s ideology or political aspirations).
126. See ARIE W. KRUGLANSKI, JOCELYN J. BÉLANGER, & ROHAN GUNARATNA., THE
THREE PILLARS OF RADICALIZATION: NEEDS, NARRATIVES, AND NETWORKS 77 (2019).
127. See CRELINSTEN, supra note 111 (listing the ideological influences); see also ALAN
KREUGER, WHAT MAKES A TERRORIST: ECONOMICS AND ROOTS OF TERRORISM 12
(2007) (arguing that the rich are as likely as the poor to participate in terrorist acts); Quan
Li, Does Democracy Promote or Reduce Transnational Terrorist Incidents?, 49 J. CONFLICT RESOL.
278, 294 (2005) (“[D]emocratic participation reduces transnational terrorist incidents in a
country. Government constraints, subsuming the effect of press freedom, increase the number of terrorist incidents in a country”).
128. U.N., Security Council Open Debate on “Security, Development and the Root Causes of
Conflicts” (Nov. 17, 2015), https://www.un.org/counterterrorism/events/securitycouncil-open-debate-security-development-and-root-causes-conflicts; see generally Isabelle
Duyvesteyn, Great Expectations: the Use of Armed Force to Combat Terrorism, 19 SMALL WARS
& INSURGENCIES 328 (2008).
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Neither the socio-economic-political nor ideological model can predict
with sufficient certainty why terrorism occurs and who among the millions
of people living under such aggrieved conditions will resort to violence. 129
Notably, most of the terrorism literature focuses on terrorist organizations and their members who reside in conflict zones or under foreign
occupation. Whether it is the Irish Republican Army, the Italian Red Brigades, the Tamil Tigers, Hamas, Hizbullah, Al Qaeda, or ISIS, the case
studies examine environments starkly different than the United States
where there is no civil war, internal insurgency movement, or interstate
war taking place on its soil. 130 Moreover, the macro-level structural models
of radicalization are so general and broad that they are of little use in guiding law enforcement tasked with operationalizing counterterrorism. 131
Whatever preliminary conclusions can be made from the literature have
limited applicability to US domestic counterterrorism.
For these reasons, individualized psychological models are relied
upon for preventing terrorism in the absence of an organized terrorist organization on US soil. 132 Among the various individualized radicalization
theories, the social network theory is the most salient within the FBI,
which in turn explains how and why sting operations are purposefully designed to target Muslims.
B. Psychological Models
Dissatisfied with structural models’ inability to predict which few of
the large numbers of poor, oppressed, uneducated, or ideologically zealous
people will become terrorists, some scholars turn to individual psychological models to predict radicalization. Through case studies and interviews
of terrorists, these scholars attempt to develop psychological profiles of a

129. A number of large-scale empirical studies have known no relationship between poverty and terrorism, both at the individual and aggregate level of country of origin. Alan B.
Krueger & Jatka Maleckova, Education, Poverty, and Terrorism: Is There a Causal Connection?,
17 J. OF ECON. PERSPECTIVES Summer 2003, at 119; SAGEMAN, supra note 37, at 69, 99136 (noting movements and Robert Pape’s Dying to Win); HORGAN, supra note 101, at 3;
LEADERLESS JIHAD, supra note 70, at 48 (noting that most terrorists come from middle class
families but claim to fight on behalf of their poor brethren).
130. See, e.g., JAMES DINGLEY, THE IRA: THE IRISH REPUBLICAN ARMY (2012); JOHN
CASERTA, THE RED BRIGADES: ITALY’S AGONY (1978); MATTHEW LEVITT, HAMAS:
POLITICS, CHARITY, AND TERRORISM IN THE SERVICE OF JIHAD (2006); AMAL SAADGHORAYEB, HIZBULLAH: POLITICS AND RELIGION (2015); FAWAZ A. GERGES, THE RISE
AND FALL OF AL-QAEDA (2011); BRIAN L. STEED, ISIS: THE ESSENTIAL REFERENCE GUIDE
(2019).
131. HORGAN, supra note 101, at 5
132. John Horgan, From Profiles to Pathways and Roots to Routes, Perspectives on Psychology
on Radicalization into Terrorism, 618 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 80, 84 (2008).
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typical terrorist as part of what scholars Max Taylor and John Hogan call
“personal factors.” 133 Consequently, three psychological approaches undergird radicalization theory: psychoanalytic, psychological profiling, and
social psychology.
The psychoanalytic approach argues that identity, narcissism, and paranoia theories explain why a person may turn to violence in response to
frustration, disappointment, or humiliation experienced in their lives. 134
Under this analytical frame, terrorists are presumed to possess psychopathic
disorders, which in the 1970s and 1980s was the predominant view in terrorism studies. 135 Some scholars contend that terrorists possess authoritarian-extremist personalities that increase their ambivalence toward authority, emotional detachment from the consequences of their actions, magical
thinking, destructiveness, and adherence to violent subcultures. 136 In 1981,
researchers who studied 227 German terrorists proffered two types of terrorist leaders: 1) an extroverted personality that is “unstable, uninhibited,
inconsiderate, self-interested and unemotional,” and 2) a neurotically hostile person who “rejects criticism, and is intolerant, suspicious, aggressive
and defensive.” 137 Another study of the Irish context argued that authoritarian personality types are attracted to conflict-oriented groups such as
terrorist groups (and police forces).138
By the late 1980s, theories that terrorists are psychopathic or clinically
disordered in some way fell out of favor, as the empirical research did not
support these psychoanalytic theories. 139 After decades of research, it became clear there was no single “terrorist mindset” that could explain the

133. Max Taylor & John Horgan, A Conceptual Framework for Addressing Psychological Process in the Development of the Terrorist, 18 TERRORISM AND POL. VIOLENCE 585, 588 (2006).
Narcissism theory posits that chronic abuse or humiliation during childhood causes an absence of morality and empathy in adulthood such that if they experience “narcissistic injury”
or ego-threat, their response is to eliminate the source of injury as necessary. KRUGLANSKI,
ET AL., supra note 126, at 70.
134. KRUGLANSKI ET AL., supra note 126, at 70.
135. FRANCO FERRACUTI & FRANCESCO BRUNO, Psychiatric Aspects of Terrorism in Italy, in
THE MAD, THE BAD, AND THE DIFFERENT 209 (1981); Analysen zum Terrorismus 3:
Gruppenprozesse (W. von Baeyer-Katte, D. Claessens, H. Feger & F. Neidhart eds., Darmstadt:
Westfeutscher Verlag, 1982).
136. See generally Franco Ferracuti, A Sociopsychiatric Interpretation of Terrorism, 463 ANNALS
AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 129 (1982); see also FRANCO FERRACUTI & FRANCESCO
BRUNO, PSYCHIATRIC ASPECTS OF TERRORISM IN ITALY, in THE MAD, THE BAD, AND
THE DIFFERENT 209 (1981); see also KRUGLANSKI ET AL., supra note 126, at 71.
137. HORGAN, supra note 34, at 52. (quoting Analysen zum Terrorismus 3: Gruppenprozesse
(W. von Baeyer-Katte, D. Claessens, H. Feger & F. Neidhart eds., Darmstadt: Westfeutscher
Verlag, 1982).
138. See generally KEN HESKIN, NORTHERN IRELAND: A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS
(1980).
139. HORGAN, supra note 34, at 48-49.
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psychology of individuals drawn to violent political action. Indeed, most
serious scholars acknowledge that terrorists are for the most part not psychopaths that suffer from serious personality abnormalities.140 Structural
theorists point this out when emphasizing that environmental and situational factors substantially affect a person’s decision to engage in political
violence, which should prompt states to focus on social, economic, and
political inequities that may attract certain populations to terrorist
groups. 141 Another problem with psychological accounts of terrorism is
that they cannot take into account the heterogeneity of terrorism across
countries, regions, and continents.142 As Taylor and Quale point out, most
of the studies of terrorists offer broad, common-sense explanations that lack
the specificity required to be translated into psychological concepts.143
Some terrorism researchers have focused on developing a profile of a
typical terrorists in terms of gender, age, nationality, citizenship status, education levels, employment status, profession, or religion. 144 These researchers have attempted to create data-driven terrorist profiles. 145 However, such profiling encourages a one-size-fits-all approach to terrorism
management and a response that is easy for terrorists to evade by sending
people who do not fit the profiles. 146 The few qualitative empirical studies
of interviews of convicted terrorists confirm what skeptics already knew—
there simply is no “terrorist profile.”147
Other scholars have created lists of ‘risk factors’ that purportedly put
a person on the ‘pathway to terrorism.’ However, these factors are ad hoc,
untested, and vastly overinclusive. Tomas Precht identifies three sets of
risk factors he argues motivate a Muslim to become radicalized. The first
are background factors such as personal struggles with religious identity,
experiences with discrimination, and lack of social integration.148 The
140. TED ROBERT GURR, THE ROOTS OF TERRORISM ECONOMIC FACTORS 97-114
(2013); see also MAX TAYLOR, THE TERRORIST (1988); see generally MAX TAYLOR & ETHEL
QUAYLE, TERRORIST LIVES (1994).
141. GURR, supra note 140.
142. See generally Marc Sageman, The Stagnation in Terrorism Research, 26 TERRORISM &
POL. VIOLENCE 565 (2014).
143. TAYLOR, supra note 140; TAYLOR & QUAYLE, supra note 140.
144. HORGAN, supra note 34, at 67.
145. See generally AARON MANNES, PROFILES IN TERROR: A GUIDE TO MIDDLE EAST
TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS (2004).
146. HORGAN, supra note 101, at 4.
147. Randy Borum, Radicalization into Violent Extremism II: A Review of Conceptual Models
and Empirical Research, 4 J. OF STRATEGIC SEC. 37, 37-62 (2012).
148. TOMAS PRECHT, DANISH MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, HOME GROWN TERRORISM AND
ISLAMIST RADICALISATION IN EUROPE 6 (2007), https://www.justitsministeriet.dk/sites
/default/files/media/Arbejdsomraader/Forskning/Forskningspuljen/2011/2007/Home
_grown_terrorism_and_Islamist_radicalisation_in_Europe_-_an_assessment_of_influencing_factors__2_.pdf.
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second are trigger factors that include people and events that provoke or
incite either antipathy or activism. 149 And the third are opportunity factors
that include physical and virtual spaces such as the Internet, mosques, penal
institutions, and social groups. 150 All of these risk factors inform FBI sting
operations where informants and undercover agents identify individuals
experiencing personal struggles and angry about the US military’s interventions in Muslim-majority countries. 151 Once they find their targets, the
government operatives proceed to manipulate the target to transform his
grievances into terrorist action.
Forensic psychologist John Horgan lists multiple risk factors that may
radicalize an individual, including emotional vulnerability, dissatisfaction
with current political or social events, perceptions that nonviolent political
action will not effectuate change, identification with victims of a real or
perceived grievance, belief that engaging in violence against the state is not
inherently immoral, belief they can achieve more in death than in life, and
their kinship and social ties with others with similar experiences or already
involved in terrorist activities. 152 Horgan contends these factors provide “a
powerful framework for an openness to socialization into terrorism, or a
nurtured predisposition for involvement.” 153 While terrorists may exhibit
some of these factors, so too do millions of people who are not terrorists.
The risk factors are so overinclusive as to make them nearly useless.
C. Social Network Theory and the Lone Wolf Pack
Having failed to provide a reliable predictive theory based on specific
psychology or environmental factors, terrorism experts latched on to the
latest fad in terrorism studies—the ‘pathways to terrorism’ model. Attention is now on the gradual process by which a person gets involved and
socialized to become a terrorist. 154 The last risk factor in Horgan’s list—
kinship, social ties, and social networks—centers this analysis. Horgan’s
work merges with Marc Sageman’s social network theory to produce the

149. Id.
150. Id.
151. See, e.g., United States v. Rezwan Ferdaus, 1:11-cr-10331 (D. Ma 2011); United
States v. Antonio Martinez, 1:10-cr-00798 (D. Md. 2010); United States v. Mohamud,
3:10-cr-00475 (D. Or. 2010); United States v. Sheikh, 5:13-cr-00305 (E.D.N.C. 2013);
United States v. Calloway, 1:17-cr-00089 (D.D.C. 2017); United States v. Alam, 1:19-cr00280 (E.D.N.Y. 2019); United States v. Langhorne, 3:19-cr-00218 (M.D. Fl 2019).
152. Horgan, supra note 132, at 84-85.
153. HORGAN, supra note 101, at 13.
154. HORGAN, supra note 101, at 1-7; Clark McCauley & Sophia Moskalenko, Mechanisms of Political Radicalization: Pathways Toward Terrorism, 20 TERRORISM & POL. VIOLENCE
418 (2008).
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claim that radicalization and collective political action are closely related to
interpersonal relationships and connections to others already radicalized. 155
According to Sageman, social contagion among friends and social
networks increases the likelihood of engaging in risky behavior, including
political violence. 156 A person’s proclivity toward engagement with terrorism is “the power of the group, the content and process of ideology (or
ideological control), the influence of a particular leader and feedback from
experiences both inside and outside the movement.” 157 Terrorism as a network, therefore, is comprised of degrees of interrelatedness among its people (e.g. the density) and the centrality of certain individuals actors (e.g.
hubs of influence) within the organization. When applied to radicalization
of Muslim youth diaspora in Western countries, Sageman contends they
are usually “small groups of friends and relatives, who spontaneously selforganize into groups that later turn to terrorism.”158
This decentralized theory attempting to explain the few terrorists acts
by Muslim diaspora is what Sageman calls “leaderless jihad.” 159 Sageman
posits that after 2001 violent political extremism in the West has been orchestrated by small, informal social groups rather than hierarchical paramilitary organizations. 160 Informal social networks purportedly radicalize
members into ideological extremism as the precursor to engaging in political violence. Sageman calls these groups a lone wolf pack or a ‘bunch of
guys’ that self-organize into a group supportive of Al Qaeda or ISIS and
then later commit terrorism. 161
Accordingly, the radicalization process is bottom-up in four stages
comprised of 1) a sense of moral outrage, 2) the outrage is based on the
belief there is a war against Islam, 3) a resonance of the moral outrage with
a personal experience, and 4) acting on the moral outrage through social
network resulting in further radicalization due to intra-group dynamics. 162

155. MARC SAGEMAN, UNDERSTANDING TERRORIST NETWORKS 128 (2004); see also
Vincenzo Ruggiero, Brigate Rosse: Political Violence, Criminology and Social Movement Theory,
43 CRIM., L & SOC. CHANGE 289 (2005) (finding that a sizeable number of Italian left-wing
militants who joined an underground group were friends with at least one member before
joining).
156. KRUGLANSKI, ET AL., supra note 126, at 78.
157. HORGAN, supra note 101, at 13.
158. Violent Islamist Extremism – 2007 Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. &
Gov’t Affairs, 110th Cong. 123 (2007) (statement of Marc Sageman, M.D., Ph.D., Principal,
Sageman Consulting, LLC).
159. LEADERLESS JIHAD, supra note 70.
160. Id. at 172.
161. Id. at 65–67, 69; Raffaello Pantucci, A Typology of Lone Wolves: Preliminary Anaylsis
of Lone Islamist Terrorists, in DEVELOPMENTS IN RADICALISATION AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE
25 (International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence ed., 2011).
162. KRUGLANSKI ET AL., supra note 126, at 79.
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Sageman goes on to argue that the theological radicalism within a group
dynamic is the cause of the group’s radicalization. 163 However, this lone
wolf pack will not necessarily take the final step of making contact with
operational terrorists. This is where the FBI comes in.
A closer look at the anatomy of a sting operation demonstrates how
the FBI structures its sting operations to apply the social network theory.
Informants and undercover agents create the social ties and foster trust necessary to manipulate and pressure their Muslim targets to join a fake terrorist plot. 164 Government operatives spend months, and sometimes years,
to radicalize the Muslim target. 165 They create a secret (fake) terrorist cell
with targets that triggers a strong sense of cohesion among the group members. 166 And because most targets know nothing about building bombs or
planning a terrorist attack, the informants and undercover agents play an
outsized role in planning and executing the plot. 167 When the defendant
later alleges he was entrapped, the law fails to protect him from the government’s predatory practices because proof of radicalization is all the government needs to prove predisposition. 168 The defendant’s posts on social
media and in chat rooms, though otherwise protected by the First Amendment, is often the basis on which the government proves his disposition to
commit a terrorism act.
For sting operations to withstand an entrapment defense, the FBI targets Muslim men who express dissident views, ideally on the fringes of the
political spectrum. Agents and informants find them by scouring the internet and social media. They look for individuals posting, consuming, or
verbally supporting extremist content online that includes bombast, puffery, and blowhard statements commending Al Qaeda and ISIS. 169 But the
FBI provides more than the means and opportunity for these “radical”
Muslims to engage in a fake terrorist plot. Informants and undercover
agents manipulate, coerce, and encourage the targeted individual to take

163. LEADERLESS JIHAD, supra note 70, at 86-87.
164. Aaronson & Abowd, supra note 7.
165. Id.
166. See McCauley & Moskalenko, supra note 154, at 417, 421-23 (describing the different means by which individuals ‘radicalize’ within small groups of friends and comrades).
167. Id.
168. See generally Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932); Sherman v. United States,
356 U.S. 369 (1958); United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973); Matthews v. United
States, 485 U.S. 58 (1988); Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540 (1992). See also Aziz,
supra note 41.
169. Sahar F. Aziz & Khaled Beydoun, Fear of a Black and Brown Internet: Policing Online
Activism, 100 B.U. L. REV. 1153, 1157-75 (2020).
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action. And when the target is indicted, government officials proudly announce their success in defeating “homegrown Muslim terrorism.”170
IV. RADICALIZATION THEORY AND“MUSLIM
HOMEGROWN TERRORISM”
In their search for homegrown terrorism, FBI agents look for distribution of extremist ideas instead of predicate acts of an ongoing or impending crime to initiate a sting operation. 171 FBI Director Robert
Mueller’s comments before the Judiciary Committee in 2011 tellingly concluded: “We also confront the increasing use of the Internet for spreading
extremist propaganda, and for terrorist recruiting, training, and planning. . . Thousands of extremist websites promote violence to an online
worldwide audience predisposed to the extremist message. They are posting videos on how to build backpack bombs and bio-weapons. They are
using social networking to link terrorist plotters and those seeking to carry
out these plans.” 172
To be sure, the volume of propaganda published online by foreign
terrorist organizations has proliferated in the past two decades. 173 In the

170. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Florida Man Convicted at Trial of Attempting
to Use a Weapon of Mass Destruction and Providing Material Support to ISIL (Jan. 31, 2017),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/florida-man-convicted-trial-attempting-use-weapon-massdestruction-and-attempting-provide (announcing conviction of Harlem Suarez); Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Jury Convicts Former Police Officer of Attempting to Support
ISIS (Dec. 18, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/jury-convicts-former-police-officer-attempting-support-isis (announcing conviction of Nicholas Young); Press Release,
FBI Nat’l Press Office, FBI Director Robert Mueller and Department of Homeland Security Secretary Tom Ridge Announce the Filing of a Criminal Complaint Charging Hemant
Lakhani (Aug. 13, 2003), https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/news/pressrel/press-releases
/fbi-director-robert-mueller-and-department-of-homeland-security-secretary-tom-ridgein-washington-announced-the-filing-of-a-criminal-complaint-charging-hemant-lakhani;
Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office S.D.N.Y., Three Men Each Sentenced in Manhattan
Federal Court to 25 Years in Prison for Plotting to Bomb Bronx Synagogues and Shoot
Down U.S. Military Planes (June 29, 2011), https://www.justice.gov/archive/usao/nys
/pressreleases/June11/cromitieetalsentencingspr.pdf (announcing sentences of Newburgh
Four); Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Union County Man Is Sentenced To Five Years
In Prison For Making A False Statement To The FBI (July 30, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/usao-wdnc/pr/union-county-man-sentenced-five-years-prison-making-falsestatement-fbi (announcing conviction of Alexander Samuel Smith).
171. See Derek M.D. Silva, Police and Radicalization, in THE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL
CONTROL, supra note 120, at 249, 257.
172. Hearing on the Oversight of the Fed. Bureau of Investigation Before the Judiciary Comm. of
the H.R., 112th Cong. 2-3 (2011) (statement of Robert S. Mueller, III, Director, Federal
Bureau of Investigation).
173. Kees Van Den Bos, Why People Radicalize: How Unfairness Judgements are Used to Fuel
Radical Beliefs, Extremist Behaviors, and Terrorism, in Persp. on Just. and Morality, at 44-85
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case of Al Qaeda, its leaders have published magazines, created websites
and bomb construction manuals, and produced videos for the purpose of
encouraging Muslims in the United States and Western Europe to engage
in domestic terrorism. 174 This strategy arose in part from Al Qaeda’s inability to send trained operatives to Western nations after 2001. The heightened security measures in the US coupled with Al Qaeda’s defensive posture in the face of military attacks in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Yemen made
online recruitment a necessary alternative. 175 Fortunately, these efforts
have been a massive failure because implementing instructions on how to
build a bomb requires expertise and access to high explosives or blasting
caps, which are nearly impossible to obtain in the US without government
detection. 176
While real terrorists’ efforts to persuade Muslims to commit ‘lone
wolf’ terrorist attacks most certainly should be foiled by law enforcement,
the state’s response has been an over-reaching counterterrorism regime that
categorically treats Muslims’ political dissent as a security threat. Opposition by Muslims to America’s occupation of Iraq, drone strikes in Afghanistan, and imperialistic policies in the Middle East has triggered thousands
of investigatory visits by FBI agents to Muslims’ workplaces, homes, and
mosques. 177 Ironically, the systemic targeting of Muslims has bolstered Al
(Carolyn Hafer & Mario Gollwitzer eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2018); Karen J. Greenberg,
Counter-Radicalization Via the Internet, 668 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 165, 165
(2016); BRIAN A. JACKSON, ASHLEY L. RHOADES, JORDAN R. REIMER, NATASHA
LANDER, KATHERINE COSTELLO & SINA BEAGHLEY, HOMELAND SEC. OPERATIONAL
ANALYSIS CTR., PRACTICAL TERRORISM PREVENTION: REEXAMINING U.S. NATIONAL
APPROACHES TO ADDRESSING THE THREAT OF IDEOLOGICALLY MOTIVATED VIOLENCE
69 (2019) (“At its peak, ISIS’s social media campaign consisted of between 40,000 and
90,000 individuals—including active propagandists and participants in the group’s larger
“social media echo chamber,” which aims to reinforce and spread the group’s messages.”).
174. RAFFAELLO PANTUCCI, A TYPOLOGY OF LONE WOLVES: PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS
OF LONE ISLAMIST TERRORISTS 3, 7 (2011), https://icsr.info/wp-content/uploads/2011
/04/1302002992ICSRPaper_ATypologyofLoneWolves_Pantucci.pdf.; MARK S. HAMM&
RAMON SPAAIJ, THE AGE OF LONE WOLF TERRORISM 152 (2017).
175. PANTUCCI, supra note 174, at 10; LEADERLESS JIHAD, supra note 70, at 132-33.
176. David C. Benson, Why the Internet is Not Increasing Terrorism, 23 SEC. STUD. 293, 306
(2014).
177. See, e.g., Petra Bartosiewicz, To Catch a Terrorist: The FBI Hunts for the Enemy Within,
HARPER’S MAG. 37 (Aug. 2011), https://harpers.org/archive/2011/08/to-catch-a-terrorist
(“[I]n November 2001, the Department of Justice began conducting ‘voluntary interviews’
with 5,000 Middle Eastern noncitizens. Hundreds of FBI agents were dispatched across the
country to conduct the interviews, with standard questions like ‘Are you aware of anybody
who reacted in a surprising way about the terrorist attacks?’); Mary Beth Sheridan, Interviews
of Muslims to Broaden: FBI Hopes to Avert a Terrorist Attack, WASH. POST (July 17, 2004),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A56080-2004Jul16.html; Shirin Sinnar, Questioning Law Enforcement: The First Amendment and Counterterrorism Interviews, 77
BROOK L. REV. 41 (2011) (discussing “voluntary” interviews and their consequences for
interviewees); ADC Requests DHS Civil Liberties Investigation Into: Operation Frontline
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Qaeda and ISIS’s recruitment narrative that the Christian West is conducting a war on Muslims.178 The more the U.S. government imputes a criminal connotation to the term “Islamist,” the more members of foreign terrorist organizations believe their violent acts are a form of legitimate revolt
against state oppression. 179 The US government’s myopic labeling of terrorism as “Islamist jihad” thus validates terrorist groups’ propaganda. 180
Even more problematic is the FBI and large police departments’
wholesale adoption of dubious radicalization theories to manufacture terrorists. The clearest example is found in the New York Police Department’s report entitled Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat
published in 2007 and the FBI’s intelligence analysis entitled The Radicalization Process: From Conversion to Jihad published in 2006. 181 Building on
the work of Sageman, the report concludes radicalization is cultivated
within kinship and social networks thereby warranting police search for
and infiltration into these small, informal groups.182
The NYPD report lists four phases of radicalization that purport to
explain how an unremarkable person becomes “quite likely to be involved
in the planning or implementation of a terrorist act.”183 Not coincidentally
mirroring the social network theory, the phases are 1) pre-radicalization,
2) self-identification with Salafi Islam as a result of a ‘cognitive opening’

Targeting Muslims in 2004, AL JAZEERAH: CROSS CULTURAL UNDERSTANDING (Feb.
28, 2009), http://www.ccun.org/Opinion%20Editorials/2009/February/28%20o/ADC%
20Requests%20DHS%20Civil%20Liberties%20Investigation%20into%20Operation%
20Frontline%20Targeting%20Muslims%20in%20the%20US%20in%202004.htm; Seth
Cline, The 1993 World Trade Center Bombing: A New Threat Emerges, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP. (Feb. 26, 2013), https://www.usnews.com/news/blogs/press-past/2013/02/26/the1993-world-trade-center-bombing-a-new-threat-emerges (discussing a Triangle Center on
Terrorism Homeland Security Study which noted Muslim Americans caused only 33 of the
over 300 post-9/11 deaths by acts of political violence or mass shooting).
178. Christopher M. Blanchard, Al Qaeda: Statements and Evolving Ideology, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV. (July 9, 2007), https://sgp.fas.org/crs/terror/RL32759.pdf.
179. See FRANCOIS BURGAT, ISLAMISM IN THE SHADOW OF AL-QAEDA 8 (2008) (discussing the impact of the American narrative on terror).
180. See also Sahar F. Aziz, Losing the ‘War of Ideas’: A Critique of Countering Violent Extremism Programs, 52 TEXAS INT’L L.J. 255, 261 (2017) (describing the recruiting narrative of
violent American military intervention and support of dictators).
181. Randy Borum, Radicalization into Violent Extremism II: A Review of Conceptual Models
and Empirical Research, 4 J. STRATEGIC SEC. 37, 37-62 (2012); Federal Bureau of Investigation, The Radicalization Process: From Conversion to Jihad (May 10, 2016), available at
https://hope-radproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/FBI-2006-The-radicalizationprocess-From-conversion-to-Jihad.pdf.
182. See Derek M.D. Silva, Police and Radicalization, in THE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL
CONTROL, supra note 120, at 249, 252.
183. MITCHELL D. SILBER & ARVIN BHATT, N.Y.C. POLICE DEP’T, RADICALIZATION IN
THE WEST: THE HOMEGROWN THREAT 6 (2007), https://seths.blog/wp-content/uploads
/2007/09/NYPD_Report-Radicalization_in_the_West.pdf.
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that leads to association with like-minded others, 184 3) indoctrination
through a progressive intensification of beliefs, and 4) jihadization or the
acceptance of an individual duty to participate in jihad. 185 Indicia of phase
two, for example, include lawful activities of increased religiosity characterized by frequent attendance at mosques, wearing traditional Muslim attire, growing a beard, and involvement in a pro-Muslim social group or
political cause. 186 Expressing grievances of anti-Muslim discrimination and
human rights violations are indicators of phase three. 187 The outcome is a
presumption of terrorist inclinations imputed on religious dissident Muslim
men.
An influential European report mirroring the NYPD’s report and
published the same year concludes:
[r]adicalisation often starts with individuals who are frustrated
with their lives, society or the foreign policy of their governments. A typical pattern is that these individuals meet other
like-minded people, and together they go through a series of
events and phases that ultimately can result in terrorism. However, only a few end up becoming terrorists. The rest stop or
drop out of the radicalisation process at different phases.188
The claims in both reports have been adopted as orthodoxy among the
federal agencies tasked with countering domestic terrorism. And here is
where the FBI’s sting operations intentionally make the few into many
through intensive psychological manipulation of Muslim males in fake terrorism plots who would have remained merely blowhards and armchair
ideological extremists—offensive but legal. These practices have become
so abusive that Marc Sageman, the same scholar who proffered the social
network theory emulated by the FBI, has concluded “[a]fter over a decade

184. The ‘cognitive opening’ concept was introduced by Quintan Wiktoworwicz’s Radicalization Theory that argues a psychological crisis such as a death in the family, experiences
of discrimination or political repression, or an identity crisis shakes the person’s previously
accepted beliefs to make him more receptive to other views and perspectives. QUINTAN
WIKTOROWICZ, RADICAL ISLAM RISING: MUSLIM EXTREMISM IN THE WEST 127 (2005).
185. SILBER & BHATT, supra note 183, at 36-37, 43-46. The same radicalization theory
was adopted by the Danish Ministry of Defense in its assessment of Islamist radicalization
in Europe. PRECHT, supra note 148, at 34-37.
186. SILBER & BHATT, supra note 183, at 31.
187. RUTGERS CTR. FOR SEC., RACE AND RIGHTS, supra note 181; MIKE GERMAN,
DISRUPT, DISCREDIT, AND DIVIDE: HOW THE FBI DAMAGES DEMOCRACY 110 (2019).
188. PRECHT, supra note 148, at 5.
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of intense search, there still has been no discovery of any single spotterrecruiter—except for FBI undercover agents.”189
CONCLUSION
While sting operations and the use of informants can be effective law
enforcement tools, their use becomes illegitimate when they manufacture
crime that otherwise would not have occurred but for the government’s
predatory practices. What often determines whether the government will
abuse these investigative practices is the racial and religious identities of the
target communities. In counterterrorism, the result is an over-policing of
Muslims and an under-policing of right-wing Whites and Christians.
Rather than stopping true threats, federal agents are entrapping
young Muslim men. 190 The absence of empirically grounded theories on
how to prevent terrorism is causing the FBI to rely on false stereotypes that
religious and dissident Muslims are prone to becoming terrorists in determining how to spend its billion-dollar counterterrorism budget. Meanwhile, a cottage industry of conjecture clothed in the pseudo-science of
‘radicalization’ literature has provided a blueprint for how to create a Muslim terrorist through state manufactured terrorist plots. The result is a large
number of terrorism related cases against hapless, bombastic, indigent, and
socially isolated Muslim individuals who otherwise would likely have been
armchair extremists on social media whose accounts are frequently shut
down by social media companies, mirroring their counterpart right wing
extremists left largely untouched by the counterterrorism regime prior to
January 2021. 191
The manufactured plot follows a predictable playbook taken straight
from the pseudo science of radicalization. First, the government agents
spend months building a bond of friendship and trust with the Muslim
target. Then, the agents progressively intensify the target’s beliefs that the
United States is an oppressive nation conducting a war on Muslims and
encourage him to do something about it in the name of defending Islam.
The agent invests significant time psychologically manipulating the target
to feel angry, indignant, and motivated to act. Finally, the government
agent or informant connects the target to other undercover agents who can

189. Marc Sageman, The Stagnation in Terrorism Research, 26 TERRORISM & POL. 565, 567
(2014) (denoting that a spotter-recruiter refers to an individual who spots a potential recruit).
190. JOHN MUELLER & MARK G. STEWART, CHASING GHOSTS: THE POLICING OF
TERRORISM 31 (2015).
191. Practical Terrorism Prevention, supra note 43, at 81; Greenberg, supra note 173, at 167
(summarizing social media companies’ efforts to shut down accounts propagating terrorist
propaganda).
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teach him how to build a (fake) bomb, travel to join a terrorist group, or
purchase the equipment for the fake plot. In each phase of the sting operation, the agent or informant plays a pivotal role in steering the target from
expressing lawful extremist speech to planning for unlawful action that is
meticulously planned by a counterterrorism team behind the scenes.
Compared to European countries, the United States is unique insofar
as its broad legal protections of speech on the extreme fringes of society.
Short of posing an imminent threat of harm to others, hateful or offensive
speech is not criminalized. One need only look at the broad leeway
granted to the burgeoning masses of right-wing extremist organizations
who unflinchingly support a race war.192 And yet, these broad free speech
protections do not appear to apply to racial minorities, especially Muslims
in the post-9/11 era. Posting content that praises ISIS, Al Qaeda, or other
designated terrorist groups places the person on the state sponsored radicalization assembly line. Informants and undercover agents are deployed
to ensnare him in a sting operation with a specific purpose—to strip him
of his liberty through terrorism related charges.
If the goal is compiling as many terrorism-related convictions as possible—without regard for the real threat of violence—then the FBI’s racialized counterterrorism strategy has been wildly successful. But this success has come at a high price to the safety of racial minorities and American
democracy, both of which have been attacked by the right-wing extremists
left untouched by the multi-billion-dollar counterterrorism apparatus.
This Article exposes the flaws in radicalization theory on which the
US government has relied upon to define its domestic counterterrorism
investigations and prosecutions. The result is a manufacturing of a socalled Muslim homegrown threat that puts in jeopardy Muslims’ liberty
interests. The next article in the series examines in depth the underlying
facts of the 282 sting operations against Muslim defendants since 2001 as
well as entrapment doctrine to demonstrate how law has been woefully
inadequate in protecting defendants from government over-reach. 193 The
third article then compares the disparities in investigative methods, charging, and sentencing between prosecution of Muslims and White rightwing extremists accused of politically motivated criminal activity.194

192. Aaron Morrison, Analysis: A Race War Evident Long Before the Capitol Siege, AP NEWS
(Feb. 5, 2021), https://apnews.com/article/donald-trump-us-news-race-and-ethnicityconspiracy-theories-philanthropy-f8f793b94b0dd7e8ec62957dcbeb53d8; but see FBI,
Confronting White Supremacy: Examining the Biden Administration’s Counterterrorism Strategy
(Sept. 29, 2021), https://www.fbi.gov/news/testimony/confronting-white-supremacyexamining-the-biden-administrations-counterterrorism-strategy-langan-092921.29, 2021).
193. Sahar F. Aziz, Race, Entrapment and Manufacturing “Homegrown Terrorism” (forthcoming
GEORGETOWN L.J. 2023).
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When our society confronts the racialized double standards that continue to infect our criminal justice system, we can take seriously the government’s promises to protect our security and freedom. Until then, victims of right-wing extremists will remain less safe and Muslims will be less
free.

